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 ABSTRACT 
 
The West End neighborhood of Cincinnati was a thriving community of 
25,757 residents when the city decided to move forward with “slum clearance.” This 
area, rebranded as “Kenyon-Barr” also contained 2,800 residential buildings with 
10,295 dwelling units. These residents made up 4.75% of the city’s entire population. 
Yet when the city of Cincinnati decided to enact urban redevelopment plans based on 
Title 1 of the Housing Act of 1949, the majority of the neighborhood was demolished 
for commercial and light industrial uses. The question remains at what cost to the 
neighborhood’s residents? The demolition of much of the urban fabric of the West 
End has also demolished the community’s shared identity and connection to the city of 
Cincinnati.  
This problem is compounded as the current rapid redevelopment of the nearby 
Over-the-Rhine neighborhood is beginning to push new residential and commercial 
development into the small section of what remains of the West End, again leaving 
residents to wonder if they are living in a vicious cycle in which their loss is always 
the city’s gain. 
While “urban renewal” as an agent of change has been analyzed in numerous 
cities and countries, and in its varying degrees, and styles, Cincinnati has not paid 
attention to its urban renewal history, and the loss of the historic built environment in 
the West End. This work documents that story and ultimately shows how engaging in 
urban renewal in the mid-twentieth century continues to effect planning decisions in 
the West End of Cincinnati today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“I think urban renewal was the greatest thing to ever happen to this city.” 
– Charles H. Stamm, Director of the Urban Renewal Department  
for the City of Cincinnati, 19731 
 
In November 2018, the city of Cincinnati’s second master plan celebrated its 
70th birthday. Officially adopted on November 22, 1948, “The Cincinnati Metropolitan 
Master Plan and the Official City Plan of the City of Cincinnati” was the primary 
governing document for the city until the “Coordinated City Plan, Volumes I-II” was 
published in 1980, thirty-two years later.2 This planning document, while vast in scope 
and widely praised as one of the best comprehensive plans of its time, was detrimental 
to many of the citizens of Cincinnati.  
After the Housing Act of 1949 was passed in July 1949 by the United States 
Federal Government, the goals outlined in the 1948 Master Plan led the way for a vast 
amount of urban renewal, demolitions, and rehabilitation plans completed within 
Cincinnati’s city limits. The addition of subsequent Housing Acts provided federal 
funding to achieve these goals, which included the elimination of slums, the addition 
of expressways throughout the city, and the need for more acreage for light industrial 
uses – goals that were to be actualized in the Kenyon-Barr Urban Renewal Project of 
the next decade. 
In Figure I.1, the city of Cincinnati is shown with its neighborhoods. The West   
                                                
1 Dan Hurley. "Kenyon Barr Collection: Cincinnati Historical Society Library." Ohio Valley History, 6, 
no. 1 (2006): 61-64. https://muse.jhu.edu/.  
 
2 City Planning Commission, The Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and The Official City Plan of 
the City of Cincinnati. Print. https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/planning/plan-
cincinnati/resources/approved-city-of-cincinnati-plans/master-plans/. 
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Figure I.1. “Community Council Jurisdictions” A map of the city of Cincinnati and its neighborhoods, 
from the Department of City Planning, 2018. From the city of Cincinnati’s “Frequently Requested 
Maps” site, https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/planning/reports-data/frequently-requested-maps/, accessed 
04 May 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.2. “Community Council Jurisdictions” A map of the city of Cincinnati and its neighborhoods, 
with a focused view of the West End and Queensgate from the Department of City Planning, 2018. 
From the city of Cincinnati’s “Frequently Requested Maps” site, https://www.cincinnati-
oh.gov/planning/reports-data/frequently-requested-maps/, accessed 04 May 2019 
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End is seen in light green, and Queensgate immediately to the West is seen in tan (see 
Figure I.2 for a closer view). Originally, both the West End and Queensgate sections 
were one, cohesive neighborhood known as the West End before the Kenyon-Barr 
Urban Renewal Project. Now this once intact neighborhood only consists of a two 
mile by one mile sliver of its former self.  
Today, problems resulting from the demolition of the majority of the historic 
resources of the West End include the demolition the community’s shared identity and 
connection to the city of Cincinnati. As explained by Appler and Rumbach (2016):  
Historic resources are part of a community’s shared identity and function as 
places of memory and meaning for local residents. The physical fabric of a 
community can be seen as both reflecting and reinforcing cultural norms and 
social relations. If that fabric is destroyed, members of a disaster-affected 
community may be forced to ask fundamental and destabilizing questions 
about the nature of their relationship with each other and with the space in 
which their lives have been lived. Protecting historic resources can preserve a 
community’s shared identity and reinforce connections between neighbors and 
the larger community.3 
 
While the West End was once a thriving neighborhood of 25,757 residents with its 
own community identity and culture, the demolition of these resources has created a 
fragmented community that is no longer held together by the web of relationships that 
can exist in a neighborhood.4 This larger problem is also being compounded as the 
rapid redevelopment of the nearby Over-the-Rhine neighborhood in the early 21st 
century is beginning to push new residential and commercial development into the 
small section of what remains of the West End, again leaving residents to wonder if 
                                                
3 Douglas Appler and Andrew Rumbach, “Building Community Resilience Through Historic 
Preservation,” Journal of the American Planning Association 82, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 93. 
 
4 Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock (New York: Random House, 2004), 218-219. 
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they are living in a vicious cycle in which their loss is always the city’s gain. 
 
Statement of Purpose 
This thesis explores urban renewal in the West End neighborhood of 
Cincinnati. While urban renewal as an agent of change has been analyzed based in 
numerous cities and countries, there is a limited amount of existing literature on the 
urban renewal process in Cincinnati. There are valuable lessons to be gained from a 
historical review of the course of urban renewal in the West End, especially as similar 
processes are still at work today. This work serves to document the story of urban 
renewal and to ultimately show how engaging in urban renewal in the mid-twentieth 
century continues to effect planning decisions in the West End of Cincinnati today, 
including the decision to place a professional soccer stadium in the neighborhood. 
 
Note on Terminology 
 In this thesis, urban redevelopment and urban renewal are used 
interchangeably to describe a program used by city, state, and federal governments as 
a tool designed to clear, rebuild, and/or redevelop urban areas.5 
The geographic focus of this thesis is the West End neighborhood of 
Cincinnati which is bounded by Central Parkway on the east, the Mill Creek 
Expressway (I-75) to the west, the Western Hills Viaduct to the north, and 6th Street at 
                                                
5 James Q. Wilson, Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1966), xiv. 
 
  6 
the south.6 While the West End was originally considered to be one, large 
neighborhood to the west of the Central Business District, it was separated with the 
expansion of the Mill Creek Expressway, severing the neighborhood into two sections 
(Figure I.2) named the West End and Queensgate today. Both parts of the West End 
will be discussed. The area was rebranded as Kenyon-Barr (named for two major 
streets in the neighborhood) during urban renewal. Later the westernmost section was 
rebranded again as “Queensgate” and today is considered its own neighborhood by the 
city of Cincinnati. For the sake of this text, the neighborhood and area will be referred 
to as the West End since it is the original name pre-demolition and “Kenyon-Barr” 
only when referred to by specific documents. 
The phrases “the 1907 plan” or “the parks plan” refers to the Kessler Plan of 
Public Parks, 1907 and in the same vein, the phrases “The Master Plan of 1925” or 
“the 1925 plan” refers to The Official City Plan of 1925. “The Master Plan of 1948” or 
“the 1948 plan” refers to The Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and the Official 
City Plan of the City of Cincinnati, the Master Plan adopted by the city in November 
of 1948. Master plans created by the city of Cincinnati after the 1948 Plan will be 
referred to using their official title for clarity since they include the official publication 
date. These naming conventions will be used when discussing the multitude of city 
planning documents and master plans created and published by the city of Cincinnati 
throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. 
  
                                                
6 Geoffrey J. Giglierano, Deborah A. Overmyer, and Fredric L. Propas, The Bicentennial Guide to 
Greater Cincinnati: A Portrait of Two Hundred Years, (Cincinnati, Ohio: The Cincinnati Historical 
Society, 1988), 102. 
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Methodology 
 
Primary sources utilized for this thesis included newspapers published in 
Cincinnati during the time of these urban changes: the Cincinnati Enquirer, the 
Cincinnati Post, and the Cincinnati Post Times Star. These archives were accessed 
from the Cincinnati Enquirer’s online archives and the Public Library of Cincinnati 
and Hamilton County via microfiche. Additionally, the Charles H. Stamm Papers 
Collection at the University of Cincinnati’s archives provided invaluable resources 
regarding Stamm’s work for the city of Cincinnati and correspondence during his time 
as the Director of the Department of Urban Renewal. This archive collection also 
provided many historic maps, reports, and marketing materials from the period. Many 
of the planning reports, documents, and proposals were obtained from Cornell 
University’s Olin Library as well as the city of Cincinnati’s Department of Planning. 
These resources had valuable information about funding, goals, and objectives of the 
urban renewal process. The city of Cincinnati’s Department of Planning placed the 
1925, 1948, 1980, 2000, and 2012 Master Plans for the city of Cincinnati online, 
scanned in their original format, which allowed open access for research. Along with 
these sources, the Cincinnati History Library and Archives’ Kenyon-Barr Photography 
Collection provided invaluable photographs of the original building stock demolished 
during the Kenyon-Barr Urban Renewal Projects, which are utilized throughout this 
thesis. 
 Finally, while many secondary sources were utilized in researching for this 
thesis, the texts The Rough Road to Renaissance by Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal: 
The Record and the Controversy by James Q. Wilson, and Root Shock by Mindy 
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Thompson Fullilove provided helpful context and research in regard to the process of 
urban renewal and its effect throughout the United States during this time and in future 
generations. 
 
Limitations 
 This thesis is limited by a number of factors but the most important are listed 
here. The first is that while the author is from Cincinnati, she has never lived in the 
West End. Additionally, the author has never lived in a neighborhood or area that was 
affected by urban renewal, limiting her ability to understand these factors as they were 
actively happening. As well, the author is not African American, unlike those who the 
author asserts were negatively impacted by the urban renewal and city planning 
policies discussed in this thesis. The hope is that through primary and secondary 
research, this thesis can begin to look at the negative impact urban redevelopment had 
on this section of the city of Cincinnati, however the author understands that this work 
cannot fully address the multiple narratives, situations, or decisions made in Cincinnati 
during this time period or currently. 
 
Chapter Overview 
This thesis contains four chapters. The first chapter describes the various 
official masterplans for Cincinnati, including the 1907 Kessler Plan of Public Parks, 
the Official City Plan of 1925, Proposals for Downtown Cincinnati (1941), and The 
Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and the Official City Plan of the City of 
Cincinnati, the latter being completed in 1948. Adopted on November 22, 1948, this 
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plan was the major governing document that guided the city during its urban 
redevelopment plans after the federal housing legislation was passed in July 1949 that 
provided the funding for the city of Cincinnati to move forward. 
Chapter 2 will discuss this redevelopment legislation, starting in the 1930s 
with the attempts at Housing Legislation reform, progressing towards the Housing Act 
of 1949 and the Interstate Highway Act of 1956. These laws were integral in providing 
the financial capital for urban renewal in the West End and throughout the United 
States.  
Chapter 3 will look into urban renewal in the West End, starting with the 
Laurel-Richmond project and ending with the Kenyon-Barr/Queensgate projects. This 
chapter discusses urban renewal from 1948-1965 including the major planning 
decisions made in these various areas from the decision to demolish the majority of 
the existing building stock and to replace the residential structures with limited 
replacement housing, which has led to population decline in the neighborhood over the 
following decades.  
Chapter 4 will look at how this decision to engage in urban renewal in the mid-
twentieth century continues to effect planning decisions in the West End of Cincinnati 
today, including a look into the most recent discussion of placing a professional soccer 
stadium into the residential area of what remains of the neighborhood. This 
development along with the rapid redevelopment and gentrification of the Over-the-
Rhine neighborhood, which sits to the immediate east of the West End, has left many 
citizens in fear of what is to come from in the future for their neighborhood, showing 
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that this problem and issue is far from over. 7  
A concluding chapter ends this thesis, describing the major conclusions to be 
drawn, as well as a critical look toward the future of community development and 
urban planning in what remains of the West End neighborhood of Cincinnati. 
  
                                                
7 Amanda Seitz, “Metropolitan Housing Authority grants FC Cincinnati West End land buying rights,” 
WCPO, 31 January 2018, https://www.wcpo.com/news/insider/metropolitan-housing-authority-
approves-west-end-land-option-agreement-with-fc-cincinnati. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE CINCINNATI METROPOLITAN MASTER PLAN OF 1948 AND ITS 
PREDECESSORS  
 
The city of Cincinnati has an extensive history of city planning, starting with 
the Kessler Plan of Public Parks, which was published in 1907 and the first official 
city plan, the Official City Plan of the City of Cincinnati, published in 1925. The 
second plan was the first comprehensive plan in the country to be approved and 
adopted in law by a city council.8 These past experiences in planning and master plan 
documents culminated in the 1948 plan: The Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and 
the Official City Plan of the City of Cincinnati, a master-planning document that 
changed the course of the city of Cincinnati for the next forty years.  
This chapter is divided into the following four sections: The Kessler Plan of 
Public Parks, 1907; The Official City Plan of 1925; Proposals for Downtown 
Cincinnati, 1941; The Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and the Official City Plan 
of the City of Cincinnati, 1948. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: (1) to give an 
in-depth look at the major planning movements in the city of Cincinnati that 
culminated in the creation of the 1948 Master Plan including preceding Master Plans 
and; (2) to describe the 1948 plan in detail, specifically portions that were used to 
directly influence the goals and mechanisms for redevelopment in Kenyon-Barr. This 
                                                
8 City Planning Commission, The Official City Plan of 1925. Print. 3. https://www.cincinnati-
oh.gov/planning/plan-cincinnati/resources/approved-city-of-cincinnati-plans/master-plans/. 
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redevelopment of Kenyon-Barr will be explained in more detail in the following 
chapters. 
 
The Kessler Plan of Public Parks, 1907 
The first 20th century master plan for the city of Cincinnati was The Kessler 
Plan of Public Parks, which was published in 1907 (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2). Written 
by the newly created Park Commission of Cincinnati, the proposed park system was 
the city’s first discussion of planned land uses, and included parks, public squares, 
playgrounds, and parkways in the 20th century. The plan was the beginning of the city 
determining the “correct” uses of land and large planning goals in the city of 
Cincinnati, all within the larger context of urban planning movements in the United 
States.9 During the creation of the 1907 Kessler Plan, the City Beautiful Movement 
emerged as an urban planning response to the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in 
Chicago. The movement was based around the fundamental principle that the city was 
no longer only a symbol of economic development and industrialization, but could 
now also be seen as enhancing the aesthetic environment of its many inhabitants and 
to change one’s experience within cities. This included the beautification of the city 
through their park system, which set the stage for The Kessler Plan of Public Parks, 
1907.10 
                                                
9 Park Commission, City of Cincinnati, Park System for the City of Cincinnati, Print. (Cincinnati: C. J. 
Krehbiel & Co. 1907). http://digital.cincinnatilibrary.org/digital/collection/p16998coll15/id/164987. 
 
10 Norm Bolotin and Christine Laing, The World’s Columbian Exposition: The Chicago World’s Fair of 
1893 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002). http://www.nypap.org/preservation-history/city-
beautiful-movement/. 
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Within this large, national context of active government conducting city 
planning, the city of Cincinnati decided to forego reliance on private development to 
“save” city lands. The goal of the Kessler Plan was to make sure the city retained its 
“natural beauty” while being able to acquire “unspoiled properties” such as the Mount 
Echo lands on the western hills and the hill slopes along Columbia Avenue, so they 
would not be “lost.”11 The City took an active role in developing and preserving lands 
within the city limits to increase the aesthetic environment.  
George E. Kessler & Company, the consulting firm hired to create the parks 
plan, urged the city to acquire the lands consistently and gradually in order to 
distribute the improvements equitably in different sections of the city as rapidly as the 
city’s means would permit.12 As explained in a selection from the Kessler plan, the 
worry of the Parks Commission was the loss of recreational land in Cincinnati if the 
city did not play a major role. They feared the land would be lost, whether to 
development or pollution from industry, major concerns throughout cities in the 
United States at the time, but especially in Cincinnati where development seemed to 
be continuous starting with the meatpacking and brewing boom of the 1840s.13 
The plan began by outlining underlying principles, chief of which were, 
 
...(1) to provide adequate recreation grounds, accessible to all of the principal 
areas of population, now existing and most probable in the immediate 
expansion of the city; (2) to relieve unsightly conditions resulting from the 
                                                
11 Park Commission, City of Cincinnati, Park System for the City of Cincinnati, Print. (Cincinnati: C. J. 
Krehbiel & Co. 1907).  13. 
http://digital.cincinnatilibrary.org/digital/collection/p16998coll15/id/164987. 
 
12 Ibid, 50. 
 
13 “History,” Cincinnati Parks, Accessed 19 October 2018, https://www.cincinnatiparks.com/about-
us/history-2/. 
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neglected and untenable property which existed throughout the limits of the 
built-up sections, by reasons of the natural rugged formation of the land, and 
which resulted in some of the most attractive park properties that have been 
planned; (3) to preserve as far as possible the unrivaled natural scenery and 
delightful views found in every portion of the outlying districts and; (4) to 
connect in a comprehensive system all of the park properties thus selected 
together with those now existing for both easy access into each property and 
for pleasing communication from on to another.14 
 
The bulk of the report was focused on the state of current parks and recreation 
lands throughout the city and the potential for the development of new parks or 
recreation spaces in underdeveloped portions of the city. This included the creation of 
a public square and playground in the West End (Figure 1.1). Unlike other 
neighborhoods which were considered underdeveloped and in want of modern 
amenities to fill their open spaces, public space in the West End was a need in the 
overcrowded portion of the inner-city. Population density in the West End, at 136 
people per acre, was more than five times the city average. Often the only open spaces 
in the neighborhood were roads, which meant children were playing in streets while 
also dangerously dodging wagons and trucks.15 
The 1907 plan alluded to subjects which foreshadowed larger issues to come in 
the 1925 and 1948 Master Plans. These included the discussion of the use of under-
utilized land near the center of the city and traffic congestion, especially the need for 
modern improvements, as mentioned in the Kessler plan: 
                                                
14 Ibid, 16. 
 
15Geoffrey J. Giglierano, Deborah A. Overmyer, and Fredric L. Propas, The Bicentennial Guide to 
Greater Cincinnati: A Portrait of Two Hundred Years, (Cincinnati, Ohio: The Cincinnati Historical 
Society, 1988), 103. 
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The city is especially fortunate in having these considerable tracts of 
unimproved land conveniently located and well adapted to this important use 
[park planning] ...attention has been given to the important problem of 
relieving the congested traffic conditions in the lower or main city and to 
securing an adequate cross-town connection.16  
 
This seemingly, small step towards the city determining of the correct “uses” 
of land within the City Beautiful Movement context in the United States had a major 
impact on planning efforts in the city of Cincinnati for years to come.  
By the early 1920’s, the majority of the parks recommended in the 1907 plan 
had been established through, “an aggressive campaign of land acquisitions. From 
1907 to 1925, seventy parks, playgrounds, and public squares had been established, 
some with the help of major donations.” 17 After the establishment of the proposed 
parks and recreation spaces, the city of Cincinnati had to begin to tackle larger urban 
planning needs, most notably a number of topics which would have even larger 
implications going into the 1948 Master Plan (see Figure 1.2 for the proposed park and 
parkway systems that were to be implemented). 
  
                                                
16 Ibid, 17. 
 
17 “History,” Cincinnati Parks, Accessed 19 October 2018, https://www.cincinnatiparks.com/about-
us/history-2/. 
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Figure 1.1. “Terminal Square and (John Street) Playground” A proposed public square and playground 
in the West End, 1907. From the Kessler Plan of Public Parks, 1907 
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Figure 1.2. “The General Plan For a System of Parks and Parkways for the city of Cincinnati” The parks 
and parkways system (shown in green) proposed by the 1907 Kessler Plan. From the Kessler Plan of 
Public Parks, 1907 
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The Official City Plan of 1925 
The Official City Plan of 1925 for Cincinnati was the first such document to be 
officially adopted by any city of Cincinnati’s size or larger in the United States. The 
1925 Plan was created partially in response to the Zoning Ordinance passed by the city 
of Cincinnati in 1924. The City Planning Commission embarked on creating a guide 
for the growth of Cincinnati over the next fifty years. 18 
In 1925, the discipline of urban planning was going through drastic changes 
and expansions similar to the city of Cincinnati at this time. The idea of “correct land 
uses” as explained earlier during the City Beautiful Movement was evolving as well. 
Zoning and the exercise of local cities or municipalities making legal decisions for 
land use (not just suggestions as seen earlier) was becoming a more common practice.  
After the 1925 plan was published, a case from Ohio would go to the United 
States Supreme Court to challenge the idea that zoning policies and laws by local 
cities and municipalities were a valid exercise of police powers and not an 
unreasonable intrusion into private property rights. This case, Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., more commonly known as “Euclid v. Ambler” was argued in 
1926. The U.S. Supreme Court found that zoning was a valid practice as the 
government has an interest in maintaining the health, safety, and welfare of a 
community, and by extension the character of a neighborhood and the regulation of its 
land uses.19 
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Zoning became more popular after the Euclid v. Ambler decision; many cities 
jumped at the idea of determining uses for land within their cities. Cincinnati was 
earlier, as professionals and citizens had written and adopted a zoning ordinance in 
1924. The Cincinnati Building Zone Ordinance was passed unanimously by the City 
Council on April 1, 1924. It was approved by the Mayor and the City Planning 
Commission on April 3, and went into effect on May 3, 1924. 20 
This is the context in which the 1925 city plan was created; the overarching 
goals of the plan were to explain the newly passed zoning ordinance, proposed 
changes, and future developments that were needed within the city; as seen in Figure 
1.3, streetscape development design standards were also explained in the 1925 plan, 
showing how the newly adopted zoning ordinance should be interpreted.  
The plan is divided into eighteen chapters that range from community 
development, zoning, and subdivisions and housing to the financing of the proposed 
improvements and the administrative aspects of putting this plan into motion. The plan 
also contains information from the hired consulting engineers from New York, 
Technical Advisory Corporation (TAC). TAC was also responsible for creating city 
plans and zoning ordinances for cities in the New England area, including New 
Rochelle, New York, New Bedford, Massachusetts, and Springfield, Massachusetts. In 
1923, TAC consulted with the city of Springfield, Massachusetts and Frederick Law 
Olmsted to create a city plan for the municipality. 
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The 1925 Plan anticipated issues that loomed large in the 1948 Master Plan 
and the eventual urban renewal discussions, as had the 1907 Plan. The first of these 
was traffic. With the rise in both population and popularity and availability of the 
automobile, the increase in traffic became a large concern. The majority of chapter 
seven of the 1925 Plan was dedicated to rapid transit and the possibility of adding a 
modern, rapid transit subway system.21 It was explained that the operation of the rapid 
transit line would bring a reduction to the number of passengers now riding the street 
car lines, which would then clear the streets for more automobiles and less congestion 
overall. 22  The Plan also explained that real estate values of properties located along 
the rapid transit route could increase in value. The 1925 Plan is critical for its 
determination of the following findings: 
It is confidently believed that the money would have to be spent in completing 
the loop [for a rapid transit system] could be far more profitably spent in 
developing main radial thoroughfares, especially Columbia Avenue and its 
viaduct connection to Third Street.23  
 
This shows that while rapid transit for Cincinnati was proposed, the 1925 Plan 
explains that the money needed to fully complete this project would be better spent 
developing and building radial thoroughfares throughout the city. This proposal is 
actualized in the coming decades as radial thoroughfares are built in the City and the 
plan of a rapid transit system is abandoned and not realized. 
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A second important topic discussed in the 1925 Plan was a discussion of the 
benefit of land within the West End and Mill Creek Valley to the Central Business 
District (CBD) of Cincinnati. The idea that the Mill Creek Valley or West End 
neighborhood could be viewed as expendable to support development of the CBD is 
first proposed in the 1925 Plan. As would be further proposed in the 1948 Plan–the 
West End was seen as an area that could be used for the betterment of the city of 
Cincinnati, especially for the city’s industrial needs. Uses proposed varied from 
expansion of the railroad system to a possible trash dump or incinerator, but all 
proposals discussed some type of industrial zoning in the future, which was to be 
elaborated further in the 1948 Plan and implemented in urban renewal plans developed 
after 1948.24 
 A final important element in the 1925 Plan was the discussion of the use of 
excess condemnation: 
Excess condemnation or excess acquisition is a term applied to the taking of 
more property than is actually needed for a public improvement, with the 
expectation of selling the excess property after the improvement is completed, 
at an increased price, due to the benefit conferred by the improvement. Where 
the excess area is too small for the erection of a practicable building on it, it is 
known as remnant condemnation or acquisition.25 
 
Ohio, the Plan explained, was one of a handful of states in which excess condemnation 
was legal, but had only been used up to that point in the context of obtaining small, 
seemingly worthless sections of parcels that are of little or no use to the property 
owners for public improvements. The practice had been used more commonly abroad, 
specifically in England, where cases of excess condemnation allowed for public 
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improvements to be directly secured at little to no cost to the city or municipality. The 
1925 Plan concluded the discussion of the topic of excess condemnation by stating 
that, “The principle of excess condemnation should be studied with a view of its 
possible applications to various urgent improvements in Cincinnati, and in any case 
where it may be found practicable it should be applied.”26 This section of the 1925 
Master Plan is only five paragraphs, taking up only one column of text and is buried 
within the third-to-last chapter, however it is one of the more important lessons from 
this Master Plan. The city explicitly voices a desire to use excess condemnation for 
public improvements in future cases and, while the extent to which this practice would 
be utilized in one of the largest public improvement projects by the city was yet to be 
imagined, the ground work was being laid for a project at this level to take place in the 
near future. 
As discussed above, the Euclid v. Ambler case in 1926 had established that 
zoning was a valid practice nationally.27 This signaled the beginning of active 
redevelopment thinking. After 1926, the city of Cincinnati had a continuously 
functioning city planning commission with full planning powers. Between 1926 and 
1948, this committee approved lot clearances, park and recreation improvements, and 
the expansion of several expressways. 28  
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Figure 1.3. “Typical Thoroughfare Cross Sections” A description of different types of thoroughfares 
within the City of Cincinnati and how to plan for future development; early examples of zoning and 
development design standards. From the Official City Plan of 1925, 1924  
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Proposals for Downtown Cincinnati, 1941 
Fifteen years after the 1925 Plan was published, Walter S. Schmidt published a 
report entitled, Proposals for Downtown Cincinnati. 29 This report gave advice on how 
to redevelop a city with “distinct character” in which its citizens did not want to see 
“retrogress.” 30 Schmidt, a Cincinnati native and the first president of the newly 
created Urban Land Institute, conceived of an organization where the ingredients were 
businessmen with knowledge, experience, and a philosophy about the problems of the 
urban growth and decay of the American city. The Chicago-based Urban Land 
Institute emerged during this time as an independent organization designed to help 
United States land developers and as a place where practical knowledge was to be 
gathered, shared, and expanded.31 With these two goals in mind, Schmidt wrote a 
succinct report discussing his research about Cincinnati’s need for redevelopment. 
While not itself a master plan, this report is an important predecessor to the 1948 
Master Plan because of the discussion of revitalization and the current state of the 
“substandard” section of Cincinnati, current traffic issues, and the urging for a new 
master plan (which would eventually become the 1948 Master Plan). 
Schmidt explains that the 1940 Census (16th Census of the United States), “. . . 
indicates the need of widespread replanning and rejuvenation,” which is followed by 
specific information about the eleven census tracts which make up the incorporated 
portion of Cincinnati. Based on Figure 1.4, the West End is located in census tracts 1 
                                                
29 Walter S. Schmidt, Proposals for Downtown Cincinnati (Chicago: Urban Land Institute, 1941).  
 
30 Ibid, 1.  
 
31 “History,” Urban Land Institute, Accessed 08 January 2019, https://uli.org/about/history/. 
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and 5. According to Schmidt’s report, census tracts 1 and 5 contained a combined 
7,577 residence units (2,329 units for census tract 1 and 5,248 units for census tract 5), 
with 94.2% (census tract 1) and 93% (census tract 5) of these buildings being 
considered substandard. These were the highest figures for the eleven census tracts 
discussed in Schmidt’s report. Additionally, those two census tracts also contained the 
highest percentage of “colored” populations as well, with census tract 1 having a 
colored population of 75% and census tract 5 having a colored population of 95.1%.32 
This determination of substandard buildings and demographics of these “substandard” 
areas are important factors when moving into the 1948 Master Plan, including a small 
paragraph in the report that discusses building conditions. Schmidt explains,  
There is a vast area in Cincinnati, close to the central business district, which 
might be restored by a soundly conceived replanning and rehabilitation 
program. Such a program should be based upon the replanning of areas 
containing buildings that should properly be destroyed for replacement by 
more [livable] quarters, and the rehabilitation of sections where it is 
worthwhile to spend considerable sums in a remodeling program. 33 
 
and although this “vast area” was never defined by Schmidt as the West End or 
another neighborhood, this argument shows that the discussion of mass demolitions 
was entering into the consciousness of land developers and city officials.34 
Schmidt theorized that the best way to solve these major issues would be to create 
high-speed traffic routes to the Central Business District (CBD) from the outlying 
residential areas.35 
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Figure 1.4. “Cincinnati and Adjacent Area, By Census Tracts” The West End is located in census tracts 
1 and 5 as determined by this census map (marked in red by the author) and referenced in Walter S. 
Schmidt’s 1941 report, Proposals for Downtown Cincinnati. From the 16th Census of the United States, 
1940 
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Schmidt also recommended taking immediate actions for highway and traffic 
betterment, which included: creating a “quadrangle of wide arteries” surrounding the 
retail business district; building traffic bypasses around the retail center; and building 
crosstown arteries, bypassing through traffic around the CBD.36 
 Finally, some of the most important text of Schmidt’s report was the 
discussion of the principle reasons for the noted decline in the CBD and his 
recommendations for the future. He stated that the principle causes for decline in the 
CBD were: “(1) Obsolescence of houses in the older, formerly substantial residential 
districts; (2) Desire of occupants of the older sections to obtain new homes in farther 
removed districts.”37 Schmidt recommended urging Federal and State governments to 
enact enabling legislation for housing corporations with the power of eminent domain; 
or to authorize the formation of neighborhood districts with powers needed to prevent 
deterioration.38 Schmidt’s final recommendations and conclusions were in 
redeveloping and rehabilitating close-in residential areas, “...an effort should be made 
to make the city more compact and a master plan of the City be kept continually 
current, and include a complete, running real estate inventory.”39 Schmidt’s final and 
most urgent priority from his 1941 report to the City of Cincinnati was to create a new 
master plan for the city and in 1944, just three years after the publishing of his report, 
the City Council passed an ordinance to begin a process to do just that. 
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The Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and the Official City Plan of the City of 
Cincinnati, 1948  
At the time of creation of its last master plan, the Official City Plan of 1925, 
the city of Cincinnati had not fully expanded to the further reaches of suburban 
development and automobile traffic was in its infancy. As the 1948 Plan also explains, 
“Twenty years ago, too, planning for cities in the United States was still in swaddling 
clothes... The Official City Plan of 1925 was not intended to be, and it could not be, 
static.” Almost twenty years later, on February 16, 1944, the Cincinnati City Council 
approved an ordinance to start the process to formulate a new plan: The Cincinnati 
Metropolitan Master Plan and the Official City Plan of Cincinnati, 1948.40 The 
members of the Cincinnati City Planning Commission could not have predicted how 
this plan would become a detrimental document for many of its citizens in the years 
and decades to come. 
In 1944, at the start of the creation of the 1948 Master Plan, the United States 
was still in the midst of World War II. In February, it was a little over two years since 
the country had declared war following the attack on Pearl Harbor and almost eighteen 
months before the war would officially end with Japan’s surrender in September 1945. 
At this time, Cincinnati was still rebounding from the Great Depression that occurred 
from October 1929 until 1939, shortly after the publishing of the 1925 Master Plan. 
Economics inhibited a large portion of their expansion plans from taking place.  
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The Master Plan began after the approval by the Cincinnati City Council of an 
ordinance to start the process of formulating, “...an overall diagram or framework for 
desirable future development rather than a detailed blueprint of specific 
improvements.” While this makes the Master Plan seem vague it was actually very 
specific in its set of delineated goals. As explained in the Foreword of the 1948 Master 
Plan: 
We want more good homes located in modern, desirable neighborhoods. We 
want more health centers, more branch libraries, more recreation centers, safer 
streets, modern [thoroughfares], better public transit. We want to reclaim our 
shabby riverfront and to eliminate our slums.41 
 
After this list of clear goals that the City Planning Commission wished to achieve in 
the coming decades with the formulation of this master plan, the remaining pages were 
divided into seventeen chapters that covered subjects ranging from residential areas to 
public transit to produce markets. This master plan was more consistent with 
contemporary master plans. It examined every aspect of the city and ways in which the 
planning commission wished to modernize, improve, or stabilize. Similar to the 1907 
Parks Plan, the 1925 Master Plan, and the 1941 Report, the 1948 Master Plan 
foreshadowed the redevelopment of the city of Cincinnati and the changes to come in 
the West End.   
In Chapter 1, entitled “Objectives,” the 1948 Master Plan reviewed its 
overarching goals of the plan. This included the chief objective, which was, “...to 
actualize the maximum potentialities of the Area in terms of the most satisfying and 
healthful living conditions and the highest degree of economic well-being attainable 
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by its people.”42 As discussed later, this is the direct verbiage and justification used for 
the demolition of buildings within the West End. 
This first chapter then discussed this overarching goal, specifically how the 
city center does not maximize its potential, lacks healthful living conditions for 
residents, lacks modern conveniences and amenities, and has other problems. In 
perhaps the most telling section of this chapter and the entire master plan, why this 
central city has deteriorated is explained: 
These older sections originally had a period of rapid growth, followed by a 
period of stability. Then began the process of decline. Gradually and perhaps 
imperceptibly, a complex of debilitating factors came into play. The homes 
depreciated in value, partly because by their very nature they are wasting 
assets, and partly because the newer homes being built farther out in more 
attractive neighborhoods tended to make them obsolete. Selling of the older 
homes began, with changes in the type of residents, and with a gradual shift 
from owner to tenant occupancy. In the oldest and most centrally-located 
neighborhoods, the deterioration and obsolescence have proceeded to a marked 
degree and the whole pattern of land use has changed radically from its 
original character. Pursuing this course, parts of the city once containing the 
best residences have become what are known familiarly as blighted areas. In 
some of these the process of deterioration has gone so far that the only 
satisfactory solution is clearance and a fresh start.43 
 
As mentioned earlier, this section of the 1948 Master Plan may be the most damning 
when it comes to the future of the West End. The text mentions that the character of 
the population is changing. This obliquely refers to a growing population of African 
American residents. As a recent history of Cincinnati notes,  
[Around] the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, new immigrants, 
often impoverished and from backgrounds that left them poorly prepared for 
life in a crowded urban setting, further contributed to congestion in the West 
End. Around the turn of the century, the area saw an influx of East European 
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Jews. Then, during World War I, the black community in the West End grew 
considerably...By 1925, almost 80% of the city’s 38,000 blacks lived there, 
while most residents of other ethnic backgrounds, including East European 
Jews, had moved out. 44 
 
Additionally, it is reasoned in the 1948 Master Plan that, “On the basis of data 
on structural condition and sanitary facilities it was estimated that in 1940 about 
63,000 dwelling units, or about 34% of the total, were deficient in one respect or 
another. These units need major repair, or sanitary facilities, or both.”  These areas 
were considered in such a deteriorated state, “...as to call for clearance at the earliest 
possible date.” This is an echo of Schmidt’s 1941 report—that the housing stock in the 
West End or the city center was deficient and in need of repair—and would be used as 
a basis for demolition in the West End in the coming decades, the area having failed to 
provide “healthful living conditions and the highest degree of economic well-being 
attainable by its people.” 45  
It is also stated in Chapter 5 of the 1948 Master Plan, that in December 1947, 
the Cincinnati Committee to Expedite Housing recommended the City Council should 
initiate action on the preparation of a code, separate from the building code, to provide 
minimum standards for existing dwellings with respect to conditions affecting health, 
such as inadequate sanitary facilities and overcrowding.46 This section is quite 
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important because when looking back to Schmidt’s 1941 report, the census tracts 
within the city that were the most crowded and the most substandard (Census Tract 1 
and Census Tract 5), also contained the highest percentage of “colored” populations, 
with Census Tract 1 having a colored population of 75% and Census Tract 5 having a 
colored population of 95.1%.47 Schmidt concludes, as discussed prior, that these 
buildings should be “properly destroyed for replacement by more [livable] quarters.” 48  
Finally, the Master Plan stated that Cincinnati has a “serious deficiency” in the 
housing category and “...it has lagged far behind other areas.” 49 In a discussion of 
population, the 1948 Master Plan explained that often the blighted neighborhoods 
consisted of smaller household sizes of one- or two-persons. “In general, the size of 
households increases from the Basin and adjoining neighborhoods outward into the 
rural areas,” averaging a household size of 3.35 persons for the City of Cincinnati as a 
whole. The plan continued on to explain that due to these smaller household sizes, the 
blighted neighborhoods of the city center would not need larger houses in the coming 
decades, anticipating a greater demand for, “the apartment type of dwelling.” 50 While 
this does not on its face seem like a completely negative statement, this statistical 
population information will be used to defend the demolition of the housing stock in 
the West End in favor of apartment and high-rise buildings. 
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After discussing the reasoning for why sections of Cincinnati, did not meet the 
goals of having “healthful living conditions,” the Master Plan stated that in order to 
“fix” the central city, the only “satisfactory solution is clearance and a fresh start.” The 
Master Plan also mentioned other issues that the city was facing, including the need to 
restore and maintain the livability and attractiveness of the inner communities. This 
was described as “both a social and an economic necessity” and further defined 
“redevelopment” as a complete clearance, replanning, and rebuilding of an area. 51 
Besides justifying for the future needs of the West End, the 1948 Master Plan, 
similar to its predecessors, discussed the future land uses for this area after the current 
uses were to be cleared. These proposed land uses generally fell into two categories: 
industrial uses and radial thoroughfares or expressways.  
Planners saw the main land use problem for the central city as the mixing of 
residential and industrial areas. With the issuance of the zoning ordinance in 1924, 
some sections of the city were thriving because they had followed the new zoning 
rules. The blighted residential sections of the central city were often placed too close 
to industrial areas or in land space that could be “better utilized for industrial needs” of 
the city. The goal of redeveloping these areas would be to “...separate the urban 
producing and distributing machine from the living areas,” which would allow for 
“healthful, convenient, safe and attractive areas for living” which was not seen as the 
current conditions of the inner city.52  
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Chapter 4 discusses industrial uses, and specifically mentions the proposed 
land needed for these uses: 
Studies in connection with industrial requirements in the Area reveal certain 
areas now in residential use that eventually should be cleared for industrial use 
because of widespread obsolescence, flooding or present infiltration by 
industry. These areas occur principally in the West End, along the Ohio River 
bank, and in parts of the Mill Creek Valley.53 
 
The current industrial areas are described as being either too small or cramped with 
little room for expansion in the future, if needed by a corporation. “Many sites in the 
Basin area of Cincinnati possess all the desirable features of in-town location but are 
now precluded from industrial use because they are occupied by slums and are costly 
and difficult to assemble.”54 The chapter continues with an argument for why the land 
should be zoned industrial as soon as possible, “Unless...the land [is] reserved for 
industry by other means, the gradual encroachment by uses other than industrial will 
continue to shrink the supply to the point where limited choice and high prices will 
definitely discourage the industrial expansion and development of the City.” This gave 
the City a sense of urgency to create industrial zones and “preserve” the land for these 
specific uses.55 Finally, to sum up the main idea of the use of deteriorated 
neighborhoods for industrial zones: “There are numerous potential sites in present 
slum areas which should be cleared and reserved for industrial development.”56  
                                                
53 Ibid, 29. 
 
54 Ibid, 75. 
 
55 Ibid, 76. 
 
56 Ibid, 77.  
 
  35 
In Chapter 2 of the 1948 Master Plan, the redevelopment of highways is 
considered “the greatest need” for Cincinnati. “Up to this time, Cincinnati has lagged 
behind many other cities in the provision of broad, convenient entrance highways. 
Adequate highways must be provided to insure quicker ingress and egress to and from 
the city.” 57 This chapter also mentions the need for radial thoroughfares in the city. It 
is explained that expressways should not cut through or disrupt residential 
communities if at all possible. This section continues, however, stating that every area 
of Cincinnati would benefit from a strong radial highway to and from the Central 
Business District, except in a few locations in which larger parkways are already 
serving this purpose. There is only a single mention of an expressway going through 
the West End to serve the purpose of providing connection to the Central Business 
District: “The proposed routes of the expressways in downtown Cincinnati are shown 
in Fig. 28.”58 This “Fig. 28” is shown as Figure 1.5. on the page 37. While the route is 
not described verbally, it can be seen that once land is to be cleared in the West End, 
the expressway is proposed to run through the neighborhood that existed at that time. 
 The remainder of the 1948 Master Plan addresses the addition of parks and 
playgrounds and the construction of new junior and senior high schools in order to 
adapt to the changing neighborhood structures in greater Cincinnati. Yet, two 
uncategorized sections of this report are vital for the future plans in the West End. The 
first is in chapter 1 and is the discussion of legislation for these proposed plans. It 
states that if and when state and federal redevelopment legislation is passed, it will 
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require planning commissions to designate specific areas as needing redevelopment 
under the Master Plan, require a prepared land use plan for each redevelopment 
project with new densities determined, and the application of appropriate zoning and 
planning controls. This section explains that, by examining the needs of the City of 
Cincinnati before the passage of this proposed legislation, it has prepared itself for the 
use of this redevelopment legislation in the future.59 In the following chapters, the 
discussion of federal redevelopment legislation will discuss how this 1948 Master Plan 
was vital in preparing the city for this very scenario when federal redevelopment 
legislation is passed in 1949. 
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Figure 1.5. “Expressways in Downtown Cincinnati” Proposed plans for expressways in Downtown 
Cincinnati and how they will connect to existing service streets, including the portion of the expressway 
proposed to go through the West End. The West End portion of the map is marked in red by the author. 
From the Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and The Official City Plan of the City of Cincinnati, 
1948  
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Conclusion 
The goals of the 1948 Master Plan were to analyze the current conditions of 
the city in order to progress into the post-war era, including making the city a safer 
and healthier place to live, however the 1948 Master Plan would become a detrimental 
document for many of its citizens by creating goals of slum clearance, the addition of 
expressways throughout the city, and the need for more acreage for light industrial 
uses. 
The 1948 Master Plan ended with the idea of finding private funding or slowly 
working on projects within the municipal budget over the next decade. This decision 
by the City Planning Commission shows that while the plans were projected to take a 
longer time if federal redevelopment legislation was not passed, they were willing to 
complete the projects in smaller stages within the budget constraints of the city in 
order “. . . to plan broadly the kind of communities and neighborhoods and 
commercial and industrial developments we want.” The financing plan even touched 
on a subject discussed earlier in the 1925 Master Plan—the process of excess 
condemnation. “Excess condemnation provisions of the Ohio General Code may be 
sufficiently broad to cover this project, but an adequate urban redevelopment law 
would be the ideal instrument under which to proceed.”60 At the time of publishing, 
the City Planning Commission was willing to wait for private development to help 
“fix” the problems of the inner city. With the passing of the federal Housing Act in 
1949, the course of slum clearance and the history of Cincinnati would be forever 
changed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION CHANGES 
 
Starting in the 1930s and early 1940s, studies of central Cleveland and 
Cincinnati concluded that each city already showed the markings of decline. 
Cincinnati, one report noted, was at a crossroads “between becoming a static or 
retrogressive community” or becoming a “focal point for a large surrounding 
territory.” 61 In order to combat this problem, as seen in the 1948 Master Plan of 
Cincinnati, state and federal legislatures were pushing to have legislation passed 
successfully in order to accomplish the goal of urban redevelopment after almost two 
decades of failed attempts. 62 
This chapter is divided into the following six sections: Housing Reform of the 
1930s: The National Housing Act of 1934 and The Wagner Housing Act of 1937; 
Housing Reform of the Early 1940s; The Wagner-Ellender-Taft (W-E-T) Bill, 1945; 
Housing Reform, 1946 – 1948; The Housing Act of 1949 and; The Interstate Highway 
Act of 1956. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: (1) to provide an in-depth look at 
the major federal legislation changes from 1930 – 1956 as well as describing the 
notably smaller, but still impactful, changes the state legislature was enacting and; (2) 
to explain how these changes would impact the urban redevelopment plans of 
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Cincinnati, specifically in the West End in the years following. These urban 
redevelopment plans will be explained in-depth in the following chapters.  
 
The National Housing Act of 1934 and The Wagner Housing Act of 1937 
Beginning in the 1930s, housing reformers were calling for measures stronger 
than building codes and model tenements in order to solve the “problems of the 
blighted central city.” These programs often had lofty goals—to eliminate slums and 
blighted areas, and to provide a decent home for every American family. Yet, with 
these lofty goals and ideas, there was not enabling legislation from the federal level to 
help assist with these reforms. The various housing projects of the 1930s were often 
inspired by innovative public housing projects from Europe that were built in the 
1910s and 1920s. Housing reformers called on the federal government to solve the 
housing problem by enacting a rental housing program for two-thirds of the American 
public. This “two-thirds” requirement was different than previous projects in the past. 
Plans in the 1930s included not just housing for the “lowest third” of the population 
but also the “middle third” which included the working and middle classes.63  
 This call for reform at the federal level was not agreed on by all sides. 
Proponents of public housing held commercial real estate and building firms 
responsible for slums and therefore opposed government support for the private 
housing industry. They argued that commercial real estate and building firms should 
absorb the responsibility for public housing. Commercial real estate and building firms 
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disagreed and argued for the need of assistance from the federal government to 
support an ambitious plan of reforming housing in American cities. Despite the strife 
between the two sides, the National Housing Act of 1934 was passed which 
established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to provide insurance for 
private residential mortgages and home improvements, and created a secondary 
market for mortgages through national mortgage associations. This was an advantage 
to large real estate investors, such as insurance companies, and not to “public housers” 
as public housing supporters were known.64 
 Yet, public housers were divided on the best way to solve the issues of the 
declining central city and the need for public housing. On one side of the issue were 
those who saw housing as the first priority in improving the lives of the poor. They 
believed that by eliminating the slums, the goal of good, low-cost housing could be 
achieved. On the opposing side were those who generally disliked the slums and 
wanted to develop new public housing on vacant land at the outskirts of cities, hoping 
that it would eventually persuade the residents of the blighted areas to leave and move 
into the new housing. 65 
Eventually, these two factions of the public housers movement came together 
with a combined goal, fearing that their disagreements could diminish the chances of 
creating a public housing program altogether. They agreed that slum clearance was an 
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important goal of their movement but that inner-city land was too costly to be their 
first choice as a site to develop new housing.  66 
The political appeal of slum clearance helped push the public housers’ ideas 
into reality. The notion that the inner-city environment trapped the poor evoked a 
sympathetic response across the political spectrum, which lead to the instating of the 
United States Housing Act, often referred to as the Wagner Housing Act, of 1937. 
This act established a public housing program, a federal public housing authority to 
make loans, grants, and annual contributions to local public housing agencies to 
develop, acquire, and manage housing projects. This housing program was limited to 
only low-income residents, placing a cap on the income of eligible tenants and the 
rents of the public housing units themselves. The act also incorporated slum clearance 
into law by requiring that one “slum unit” be demolished for every public housing unit 
that was to be built. 67 
The housing acts created in the 1930s effectively created a two-tiered federal 
housing system. In the higher tier, the federal government provided help to private 
industry to develop housing for the middle classes by insuring mortgages and 
organizing a mortgage “market” as established by the Housing Act of 1934. These 
programs often encouraged building on the outskirts of cities, helping the middle 
classes leave the central city. In the lower tier, the federal government built housing 
for low-income people, as established by the Housing Act of 1937.  The latter faced 
difficulties immediately due to its connotation as a “poor person’s program” which 
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generally was unpopular and lacked political support. As seen in the 1940s, as the 
United States entered World War II, the Housing Act of 1937 was used to fund 
defense housing but Congress banned its use for low-income households.68 
 
Housing Reform of the Early 1940s 
Despite the lack of political appeal, slum clearance was gaining a constituency 
of its own outside the public housing movement at the turn of the decade. City 
officials, downtown businessmen, and owners of large urban real estate holdings were 
worried that slums were actively spreading. They argued that if the loss of tax revenue 
from the “spreading blight” continued, it could threaten the economic survival of the 
cities’ urban core. These powerful local leaders campaigned aggressively to clear the 
slums, replace aging building stock, improve local infrastructure, and build new 
downtown developments.69 
On the other side of the discussion were real estate interests. Backed by their 
powerful national organization, the National Association of Real Estate Boards 
(NAREB), they lobbied Congress to stop funding the Housing Act of 1937 in order to 
stop the funding of public housing. They saw public housing projects as competing 
with private businesses, gaining an advantage because they did not pay taxes. The real 
estate industry believed that public housing was the “opening wedge in an eventual 
takeover of the private housing industry by the government,” and feared that public 
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housing authorities would appropriate the best urban redevelopment sites for low-
income housing.70 
Despite NAREB’s fears and the growing suspicion of real estate interests, 
problems of land assembly and costs stood in the way of any slum clearance program. 
Inner-city industrial and lower-income residential areas were generally profitable. 
Located near city centers and major transportation routes, these sites were in demand 
for factories, stores, and low-rent residences. Slum landlords were reluctant to sell 
their properties at low prices or sometimes at all. After assembling tracts of land, 
private developers faced the expense of demolishing existing structures and building 
new ones. As a result, few private developers undertook the redevelopment of slum 
tracts.  
In 1941, NAREB proposed the setting up of metropolitan land commissions. 
These commissions would acquire blighted areas through the power of eminent 
domain and then use a combination of federal and local government subsidies known 
as “write-downs” to sell the property to private developers at below-market prices. 
“Supporters of public housing were quick to label NAREB as hypocritical for 
proposing government subsidies for urban redevelopment while condemning subsidies 
for public housing.” In the same year, government economists Alvin Hansen and Scott 
Greer proposed an edited version of NAREB’s proposal. They called for a similar plan 
but a coordination of redevelopment efforts by a national planning agency and 
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converted the subsidy loan mechanism in the NAREB plan into more of a grant 
system. 71 
In 1943, the first iteration of urban redevelopment legislation was introduced 
in Congress. City planners, led by Alfred Bettman, wrote one bill that call for a 
centralized planning authority in Washington, D.C. to guide all local efforts. 72 
Bettman, a Cincinnati native and one of the founders of modern urban planning in the 
United States, helped argue the landmark zoning case at the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., and was instrumental in the creation and 
implementation Cincinnati’s 1925 Master plan (Figure 2.1). 73,74 A second bill was 
introduced in 1943, but this one was penned by NAREB and the Urban Land Institute, 
which was similar to NAREB’s 1941 proposal.  
Major issues with both of these 1943 bills arose immediately. Neither bill 
explained a role for public housing in urban redevelopment, even though most of the 
residents of the slum areas that were to be cleared had little income and paid low rents. 
City planners wanted to enact a broad program that would rearrange the entire layout 
of cities. They were afraid of “shackling” redevelopment to housing schemes that 
would not be readily approved. Real estate interests hoped to abolish the public 
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housing program and substitute a low-income housing scheme that would be carried 
out by private developers.75 
While these bills gained little traction in the federal government, public 
housers saw the new urban redevelopment issue as reviving their “dying” program. 
The public housers made the argument that the step of providing federal support for 
urban development could not be justified unless it provided housing – or as they called 
it, rehousing – for the low-income families displaced by slum clearance. “As a 
practical matter, they pointed out, displacing low-income people from their homes 
would only spread slums into new areas.” By the mid-1940s, housing had again 
become a popular political issue. A “drought” in residential building had created a 
housing shortage, what was only predicted to become worse when GIs currently 
serving returned from war.76 
 
The Wagner-Ellender-Taft (W-E-T) Bill, 1945 
With this atmosphere, in 1945, three Senators proposed a bold, inclusive 
approach to the housing issue. Robert Wagner, Allan J. Ellender, and Robert A. Taft 
proposed the Wagner-Ellender-Taft or “W-E-T” bill. The goals of the bill were to 
remedy the current housing shortage, eliminate substandard housing through the 
clearance of the slums and blighted areas, and provide, “a decent home and suitable 
living environment for every American family,” which was to be accomplished 
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through housing production and the development and redevelopment of local 
communities.77 The eleven sections of the bill created a set of programs aimed at 
stimulating residential construction and improving the housing of all income levels 
and population groups. This was to be accomplished through private enterprise and 
public entities, all coordinated by a single housing agency in Washington, D.C. This 
bill also created a new urban redevelopment program in which the federal government 
would give grants and/or loans to local governments to cover the cost of land 
purchases and write-downs.  
This bill built on both of the previous housing policy tiers (1934 and 1937) by 
expanding the federal financial aid to the private housing industry and strengthening 
the government’s direct role in housing development. Additionally, changes to the 
previous policy included the increased effectiveness of the 1934 law establishing the 
FHA by liberalizing terms of FHA mortgages, providing FHA yield insurance that 
ensured builders of large rental apartment buildings a minimum annual profit, and 
enlarging the number of loans and grants available for farm housing. The W-E-T bill 
also revised some of the provisions in the 1937 public housing law by authorizing the 
building of 500,000 units of public housing over four years (the first to be built since 
1938), calling for the creation of a permanent national housing agency in the federal 
government, and creating a large federal research program to lower development costs 
through improved methods of housing construction, markets, and financing.78 In other 
words, the bill introduced by Wagner, Ellender, and Taft included an urban 
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redevelopment provision to aid local agencies to purchase and clear slum properties 
and then sell the cleared land to private developers.79 
While comprehensive, the W-E-T bill was not immediately approved or well-
received. Over the next four years, conflict between both sides of the housing issue 
thwarted efforts to pass a comprehensive postwar housing bill. Liberals insisted that 
public housing was essential to urban revival and that cities needed public housing to 
redevelop the slums and alleviate the postwar housing shortage. Conservatives 
opposed providing funds for public housing as a “socialistic intrusion into the private 
market.” Both sides had supporters in Congress and attempted to lobby the 
uncommitted members to sway the decision.80 
 
Housing Reform, 1946 – 1948 
In 1946, with housing legislation still not successfully passed, Republicans 
won control of the Congress. The bill was renamed T-E-W with Republican Robert A. 
Taft becoming the unlikely champion of public housing. Taft, a Cincinnati native and 
the son of president William Howard Taft, opposed the waste and centralizing 
tendencies of the New Deal programs, but he frequently visited the urban slums of 
Cincinnati and was convinced that only a government program could provide good 
homes for low-income families (Figure 2.2).81 
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Taft, along with a group of moderate and liberal Republicans, supported public 
housing and helped pass the Housing Act of 1948, a relatively weak bill that 
incorporate the T-E-W bill’s noncontroversial FHA provisions, such as liberalizing the 
terms of FHA mortgages and providing yield insurance for investors of large-scale 
rental housing and also authorized a new research agency.82 
Growing increasingly tired of waiting for serious action at the federal level, 
state legislatures took measures into their own hands. Between 1941 and 1948, 
legislatures in twenty-five states successfully passed urban redevelopment acts. After 
the publishing of the 1948 Master Plan on November 22 in Cincinnati, redevelopment 
advocates quickly went to work to make their vision a reality. In 1949, Ohio’s state 
legislature gave Cleveland and Cincinnati the power to assemble blighted properties 
for clearance and reuse.83 This bill, the Ohio Urban Redevelopment Law, House Bill 
195, finally passed after several failed attempts to pass urban redevelopment 
legislation in 1947.84 As seen in the 1948 Master Plan, this was seen as a needed item 
for the city of Cincinnati: to have state and federal legislation passed in the coming 
years to help finance the issues of the “blighted” central city, and in 1949 this goal 
became a reality. 85  
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Figure 2.1. Portrait of Alfred Bettman. From the Master Plan Report on Program and Progress, 1946 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Portrait of Robert A. Taft. From the Ohio History Connection Online Archives, 1949  
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The Housing Act of 1949 
In 1949, the newly Democratic-controlled Congress once again took up the W-
E-T bill. For six months, Congress conducted a bitter debate. Forces opposing the bill 
bombarded Washington, D.C. with letters, resolutions, and petitions to stop the 
passing of the proposed legislation. When it finally passed, the Housing Act of 1949 
put into law, in only a slightly revised form, most of the provisions of the 1945 W-E-T 
bill that had not already been enacted. The act’s major new contributions to national 
urban policy was the program for urban redevelopment, especially Title I.86 
Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 had three important components: (1) 
authorized $1billion in loans to help cities acquire slums and blighted land for public 
or private redevelopment; (2) allotted $100 million every year for five years for write-
down grants to cover two-thirds of the difference between the cost of slum land and its 
reuse value; and (3) stated that local governments had to pay the remaining third, but 
lightened the burden by allowing them to do so either in cash or in kind, by building 
needed public facilities.87 
While the Housing Act of 1949 contained other important sections, including 
the discussion of the allocation of funds for public housing and amendments to 
housing acts from previous years, Title I had the most detrimental effects on the city 
of Cincinnati and the neighborhoods in the West End. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the 1948 Master Plan counted on the passage of future legislation in order to 
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fund the improvements of the central city. Especially important for the future of 
Cincinnati was the provision that Title I federal capital grants were authorized only for 
projects that cleared “predominantly residential” slum tracts or prepared land for 
“predominantly residential” developments. In other words, the measure emphasized 
that federal redevelopment was primarily to serve the housing needs of the nation’s 
cities. It was not a subsidy for the wholesale rebuilding of the aging urban core. 88 
As a result of the passing of the 1949 Housing Act, across the country, city 
officials brought out slum clearance redevelopment plans that had been postponed by 
the lack of funding during the Great Depression and World War II, and began to bring 
attention to these once forgotten projects. The endless scrapping over public housing 
also help to deflect attention away from the urban redevelopment program embodied 
in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949. Since both real estate interests and public 
housers supported in principle the idea of clearing and rebuilding slum areas, Title I 
escaped critical scrutiny. In the years following from 1949 to 1968, the federal 
government approved 1,946 urban renewal projects in 912 communities. The most 
important to our discussion will be the Kenyon-Barr Urban Redevelopment Plan and 
the Urban Renewal Plan: Queensgate I. 89 
In conclusion, the Housing Act of 1949 was born of particular circumstances. 
After decades of economic depression and war, the nation looked forward to a better 
future. Leaders and policy makers believed that the United States could move forward 
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by raising living standards and rebuilding cities and to those ends crafted these 
housing and urban redevelopment programs, with later federal programs adding to this 
legislative foundation.90,91 
 
The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 
  During the 1950s, the United States saw the emergence of additional 
legislation that would impact the city of Cincinnati. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the 1948 Master Plan emphasized the need for major thoroughfares within the 
city.  
 Within this context came the National System of Interstate and Defense 
Highways. The first type of funding for this program was approved with the Federal 
Aid Highway Act in 1954. This provided a 60% federal contribution to the building of 
major roads. While this federal aid was intended to help reinvigorate the central city 
by splitting the cost of these highway projects, often state highway budgets simply did 
not grow as fast as federal aid appropriations. Highway departments everywhere faced 
public demands for improvements on the exiting rural, secondary, and urban federal-
aid systems, and rarely could gave attention to the new interstate routes—the most 
expensive type of projects. 92 
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In 1955, construction started on the expressway network proposed in the city 
of Cincinnati’s 1948 Master Plan, even before the passage of the landmark federal aid 
act passed in 1956. Municipal authorities in cooperation with state highway 
departments began, “...cutting costly traffic arteries through the body of the metropolis 
to draw the life blood of commerce to the city’s faltering heart.” This construction 
helped to tie the new communities developed in the suburban areas to new 
expressways and interstates whose construction came with significant federal help 
after the passing of the Interstate Highway Act. 93  
With the passing of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956, Congress called for 
approximately 41,000 miles of express highways to be built across the U.S. in about 
fifteen years, at a projected cost of $25 billion.94 Additionally with the passage of this 
act, the federal contribution became more generous, raised from a 60% match to a 
90% match.95 This move was not without issues. The standards for the urban highways 
were not ready until 1957, which slowed the construction process, the materials 
needed for construction were often difficult to acquire – especially steel for bridges – 
since the U.S. was in the midst of the Korean War. Paying for materials due to rapid 
inflation was also a challenge.96  
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While the passing of this act seemed helpful at the time, its lasting impact was not 
yet seen. It helped to aid in the financing of major urban renewal projects all over the 
United States and especially for projects in the West End; this was the last piece 
needed to move forward with plans set forward in the 1948 Master Plan as well. 
The most important challenge of the Interstate Highway Act was yet to realized. 
The construction of interstate highways often isolated and separated poorer, mainly 
African American neighborhoods from wealthier, mostly white ones.97 By the late 
1950s, the first complaints began to surface from residents being displaced by the 
swathes of concrete cutting through urban neighborhoods. Many felt they did not 
receive fair value for their condemned property, while others were angry about the 
lack of public involvement in the planning process.98 Important to the history of the 
West End, would the construction of Interstate Route (IR) 75 or the Millcreek 
Expressway. Construction on the first section of IR-75 began in August 1955, with the 
last section completed in November 1972.99 This expressway was to go directly 
through the West End, as seen in Figure 1.5, and displaced many residents of the 
neighborhood (Figure 2.3). But, no matter how many families were displaced through 
public housing projects, city-wide improvement projects, or interstate highway 
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projects, the West End had not seen anything like the displacement and change as 
were to come with the future urban renewal projects. 
 
Conclusion 
The Housing Act of 1949 was born out of particular circumstances. After 
decades of economic depression and war, the nation looked forward to a better future. 
Social reformers and politicians believed that the United States could move forward 
by raising living standards and rebuilding the cities, including Cincinnati, and to those 
ends crafted the housing and urban redevelopment programs seen in the 1930s and 
1940s. 100 
This reform was seen in various stages throughout the 1930s and 1940s 
including the National Housing Act of 1934, the Wagner Housing Act of 1937, the 
Wagner-Ellender-Taft (W-E-T) Bill of 1945, the Housing Act of 1949, and the 
Interstate Highway Act of 1956. These attempts to provide an overarching, federal 
housing policy culminated in providing funding for urban renewal in the coming 
decades. These policies were especially damning in the city of Cincinnati due to the 
goals laid out in the 1948 Master Plan. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Master Plan was 
ready to take effect regardless of access to federal funding, however with the addition 
of the funding, urban renewal was able to move forward in the West End at a 
momentous pace over the coming decades.  
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Figure 2.3. Aerial photo of the West End in the 1950s, prior to the construction of Interstate 75 and the 
Kenyon-Barr Urban Renewal Project Area. Photo is looking north, with the Union Terminal shown in 
the northwest corner of the photograph. From cincinnati-transit.net online photo gallery101 
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CHAPTER 3 
URBAN RENEWAL: 1948 – 1965 
 
After publication of the 1948 Master Plan, Cincinnati had a “blueprint” for its 
vision of the city. In order to start the massive redevelopment envisioned in this master 
plan, a few more “structural prerequisites” were needed to make these plans the 
reality. Urban development on the scale envisioned by the City would require millions 
of dollars in financing, the executive capacity to carry out the project, and most 
importantly, enough replacement housing to accommodate the thousands of people 
displaced during and after redevelopment. The City also needed to assemble a political 
consensus that would unite the political, business, and industrial elites around an 
aggressive redevelopment agenda.102 By the mid-1950s all the necessary pieces were 
put into place and Cincinnati embarked on one of the nation’s earliest and largest 
urban renewal programs.103 
This chapter is divided into the following three sections: Planning Period, 1948 
– 1951; Laurel-3 Richmond-1 Project, 1951 – 1961 and; Kenyon-Barr / Queensgate I, 
1956 – 1965. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth look at the major 
urban renewal projects in the West End from 1948 – 1965, which led to the demolition 
of the historic fabric of a culturally intact and vibrant neighborhood. The problems 
resulting from this demolition will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Planning Period, 1948 – 1951 
 Urban development on the scale envisioned by the City would require: (1) 
millions of dollars in financing; (2) the executive capacity to carry out the project, and 
most importantly, (3) enough replacement housing to accommodate the thousands of 
people displaced during and after redevelopment. Financing for redevelopment 
became available through a combination of federal programs and local bond issues. 
The Housing Act of 1949, “...provided grants and loans for the purchase, clearance, 
and residential redevelopment of ‘blighted areas,’” and the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956 provided financing, along with the state of Ohio, for the construction of interstate 
highway systems. Locally, bond issues were to provide most of the municipal share of 
urban renewal financing. Although it was often a long, arduous process to convince 
local voters to vote for new municipal bonds, the Ohio Legislature changed the 
formula so that referenda were easier to pass. “After a statewide lobbying effort, led 
by Cincinnati public officials and the Citizens Development Committee (CDC), the 
legislature voted in 1949 to reduce the favorable percentage required to pass a bond 
issue from sixty-five to fifty-five percent.” Due to this legislative change, Cincinnati’s 
City Council won approval for major bond packages in 1950, 1954, and 1956. A large 
portion of these funds were, “...earmarked for expressways, public improvements, and 
urban renewal projects in the West End.”104 
 In order to move forward with urban renewal, however, the Housing Act of 
1949 also required the “executive capacity” as mentioned earlier. Additionally, this 
executive unit needed to be able to possess: (1) the powers of eminent domain to 
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acquire the necessary real estate; (2) a central agency to carry out the redevelopment 
program and; (3) the ability to create detailed development plans for each project area. 
These three requirements would prove to be much easier to achieve than the financing 
portion. The Ohio Redevelopment Act was passed on June 29, 1949 in which it 
granted cities the power to acquire property in “blighted areas” by purchase, gift, 
exchange, or eminent domain. The act also permitted cities to designate an existing 
office, commission, or department of the city to act as the primary redevelopment 
agency. Thus, the city of Cincinnati met the first required component of the 1949 
Housing Act by the passing of the Ohio Redevelopment Act. On May 1, 1950, the 
Cincinnati City Council created an “urban redevelopment division” within the 
Cincinnati City Planning Commission that was responsible for planning and 
implementing the city’s urban renewal program.105 In 1956, the program became its 
own separate department, aptly named the Department of Urban Renewal for the City 
of Cincinnati. This department was led by Charles H. Stamm, the first director of the 
department who served from 1956 to 1965. Stamm started working for the city of 
Cincinnati in 1946 as the Executive Secretary for the Mayor’s Housing Committee, a 
semi-public agency. In 1949, he was appointed to the position of Assistant to the City 
Manager, and was in charge of urban redevelopment.106  
With the creation of the Urban Redevelopment Division, the City met the 
second urban renewal requirement. Ten months after its creation, the staff had 
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identified fifty-four project areas of four or more acres that were “blighted” and in 
need of treatment; twenty-seven of the projects were in the West End. These fifty-four 
projects were presented to the City Planning Commission and ten project areas were 
selected from the original list. The Urban Redevelopment Division was instructed to 
prepare preliminary plans for the redevelopment of each project area. On May 21, 
1951, detailed development plans for six of the ten projects were submitted to the City 
Planning Commission for approval by the Urban Redevelopment Division. Five of the 
six development plans were located in the West End. With the detailed plans from the 
Urban Redevelopment Division, the city of Cincinnati had met the third and final 
requirement of the “executive capacity” requirement. 
 The third requirement, finding enough replacement housing to accommodate 
the thousands of people displaced during and after redevelopment, proved to be a far 
more difficult problem than acquiring funds or establishing the “executive machinery” 
for urban renewal.107 According to both the Housing Act of 1949 and the Ohio 
Redevelopment Act, before development plans for urban renewal could be approved, a 
finding by the City Council must show that the displaced families, “...could be 
rehoused in the project area or in other areas not generally less desirable...and at rents 
or prices within financial means of the families displaced from the project area.”108 
Consequently, the prospect of eliminating between 13,147 and 22,354 low-cost 
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dwellings and displacing between 50,561 and 54,471 people from the West End, most 
of whom were black and poor, posed an enormous problem for city officials.109 
This shortage of replacement housing did little to nothing, however, to deter 
the planning or approval of Cincinnati’s urban renewal program. When the first two 
project plans were submitted to the Cincinnati City Council (both in the West End), it 
was determined that there was a feasible plan for the relocation of the families who 
were residing on the redevelopment sites. On September 5, 1951, the Cincinnati City 
Council approved the plans for Laurel-3 Richmond-1. Urban renewal in Cincinnati 
was officially underway.110 
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Figure 3.1. “Laurel-3 Richmond-1 Redevelopment Project” A map of the Laurel-3 Richmond-1 
Redevelop Project published by Cincinnati’s Urban Redevelopment Department, 1960. From the 
University of Cincinnati Archives and Rare Books Library, Charles H. Stamm Papers Collection 
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Laurel-3 Richmond-1 Project, 1951 – 1961  
While the urban renewal project in the “Kenyon-Barr” portion of the West End 
would become one of the largest undertakings by the city of Cincinnati, it was not the 
city’s first effort at redevelopment. The Laurel-Richmond project area, later known as 
Laurel-3 Richmond-1, covered forty-seven acres of land in the West End situated on a 
twenty-block area lying west of Linn Street (see Figure 3.1).111 Within the project 
space were the blocks that had been known by the city planners of the 1930s as “D” 
and “E”, where residents had successfully resisted the city’s efforts to clear their 
neighborhood for public housing. They were less successful this time around, despite a 
spirited defense. At two public hearings on the city’s plans for Laurel-Richmond, 
residents of these areas, “...registered vigorous opposition to the city’s urban 
redevelopment plan,” led by members of the West End Home Savers Association. 
George Dickman, Chairman of the organization, urged the City not to move forward 
with redevelopment until places were found for the displaced families to live (See 
Figure 3.2).112 
 Despite the residents’ opposition and protest, the City Council approved the 
redevelopment plans, but the West End residents joined the majority of Cincinnati’s 
electorate in voting against the 1951 bond issue that would have provided $1.35 
million for the Laurel-Richmond project. Of the $1.35 million for the project, 
$900,000 was for the Laurel-3 portion and $450,000 was for the Richmond-1 project.   
                                                
111 “New Look Ahead for Cincinnati West End; Federal Grant O.K.’d to Clear 57 Acres,” Cincinnati 
Enquirer, Sept. 11, 1954. 
 
112 “Housing Problems are Aired in Public Study on West End,” Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 23, 1951. 
  65 
 
Figure 3.2. “City Hall Marchers Protest Urban Redevelopment Plan” Members of the West End Home 
Savers Association shown protesting the Laurel-Richmond redevelopment plan. Some of their signs 
include sayings such as “People affected by urban redevelopment are against it,” “Our boys in Korea 
need our tax money,” “We love our homes! Let us keep them,” “Taxes are getting heavier, vote no,” 
and, “Urban redevelopment site is NOT slum area.”  From the Cincinnati Enquirer, October 23, 1951, 
page 7  
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Only 42% of voters approved the Laurel-3 project and 39% of voters approved the 
Richmond-1 project; each bond issue needed to be approved by 55% of the voters in 
order to pass, based on the changes by the state of Ohio in 1949.113 Despite this 
setback, the city found an inventive way to go ahead with the Laurel-Richmond 
project. Its one-third share of the project’s cost was put up in the form of “noncash 
credits.” By expanding a school, improving parks and streets, and widening Linn 
Street within the project area—improvements that were financed by bonds that voters 
had previously approved—the city was credited by the U.S. Housing and Home 
Finance Agency with enough expenditures to qualify for the federal match.114 
 Acquisition of property within the two project areas began at the end of 1952. 
Relocation of the area’s 1,617 families proceeded slowly, however, primarily because 
of the difficulty of finding homes for the 1,200 black families. By the end of 1955, 
only half of the parcels in the tract had been acquired and only a sixth of the residents 
had been relocated. 115 City officials were eager to show progress. To do this, dozens 
of Cincinnati’s political and economic leaders were gathered together in early October 
1955 to attend a “house razing” at 833 Lincoln Park Drive, including Charles H. 
Stamm (See Figures 3.3 and 3.4).116   
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Figure 3.3. “Hefty Wallops for Progress” The “House Razing” event held in early October 1955 in 
which city officials help to demolish the first home in the Laurel-Richmond Project Area at 833 Lincoln 
Park Drive. As seen in the image from left to right are: Mayor, Carl W. Rich, James W. Follin, 
commissioner, urban redevelopment, Federal Housing and Loan Finance Agency, and Charles H. 
Stamm, Cincinnati’s Urban Redevelopment Director. From the Cincinnati Times-Star, October 2, 1955 
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Figure 3.4. “First House to be Razed for Development” The first house to be demolished for the Laurel-
Richmond urban renewal project at 833 Lincoln Park Drive was occupied by Mrs. Jonette Crawford. 
From the Cincinnati Enquirer, October 2, 1955, page 1  
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The house, occupied by Mrs. Jonette Crawford, was described as an, “...ancient frame 
structure, covered with dingy yellow brick siding. It is the first of the buildings to be 
demolished in connection with redevelopment of the combined Laurel-3, Richmond-1 
slum clearance project.”117 
It took until the spring of 1959 to clear the entire Laurel-Richmond project 
area. A contract was awarded to the Reynolds Aluminum Corporation to construct a 
323-unit middle-income housing cooperative on the Laurel-3 site, a project known as, 
“Park Town,” (See #1 and #2 on Figure 3.1). On the Richmond-1 site, the Hamilton 
Corporation won the contract to develop 288 moderately priced rental units on the 
Richmond site, an apartment complex that was given the name, “Richmond Village,” 
(See #6 and #9 on Figure 3.1). Ground breaking for Richmond Village took place on 
October 28, 1960 (Figure 3.5). Both of the complexes were completed by 1961 and 
were advertising their units in the local paper (Figures 3.6 and 3.7), including the Park 
Town Shopping Center (Figure 3.8). Neither project house people of the economic 
class that had been displaced. As explained by Bleeker Marquette, head of the Better 
Housing League: 
I felt, and I am more sure than ever I was right, that some provision should 
have been made to enable at least those who wanted to go back in the renewal 
area to do so. This would have meant, of course, some public low rent units. I 
made a strong case for this. But I didn’t have a ghost of a chance of having my 
proposal accepted. Some leaders in the power structure were violently opposed 
[to public housing]. 118 
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In the meantime, planning for Cincinnati’s second urban renewal project in the West 
End, Kenyon Barr, went into its final stages. 
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Figure 3.5. “Spade Work Starts L-R’s Richmond Village” The ground-breaking ceremony for 
Richmond Village took place on Friday, October 28, 1960. Pictured in this photo from left to right are: 
U.S. Rep. Gordon Scherer (R., Cincinnati), Ed C. Gabriel, District Director of the Federal Housing 
Administration; Charles H. Stamm, city of Cincinnati’s Urban Renewal Director, Lawrence Tavenner, 
FHA official, Walton Bachrach, Vice-Mayor, George Gant, Construction Manager, Joseph DeCoursey, 
Councilman, C. A. Harrell, City Manager, Karl Kumler, Nationwide Insurance Co., Columbus, and 
Harry Krieger, President of the Hamilton Co., Cincinnati, developers of the project. From the 
Cincinnati Enquirer, October 29, 1960, page 6 
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Figure 3.6 (left) and 3.7 (right). Advertisements for the newly completed Park Town community (3.6) 
and the Richmond Village Apartments (3.7). From the Cincinnati Enquirer, Figure 3.6 was printed on 
September 24, 1961, page 109 and Figure 3.7 was printed on December 17, 1961, page 113 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Advertisement for the Park Town Plaza Shopping Center. From the Cincinnati Enquirer, 
October 6, 1961, page 38 
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Kenyon-Barr / Queensgate I, 1956 – 1965  
 As discussed earlier, the 1948 Master Plan proposed putting the Millcreek 
Expressway through the center of the lower West End and razing all 3,100 buildings 
that were located in this area. By 1956, detailed plans had been developed, plotting the 
route of the expressway and designating the boundaries of a 435-acre tract for 
clearance and redevelopment.119 Adding insult to injury, this portion of the 
neighborhood was renamed “Kenyon-Barr” for two streets that ran east-west in the 
southern portion of the neighborhood. As a resident of the West End recalled in 2017, 
“It was never called ‘Kenyon-Barr’ by any of the people who lived there. Kenyon-
Barr was just another part of the city’s marketing scheme.”120 
In November of 1956, Cincinnatians went to the polls again to vote on another 
bond issue. This would designate $41 million for city improvements of which $15.5 
million was for expressway construction and another $9 million was for slum 
clearance in Kenyon-Barr. Voters narrowly approved this issue, only 56.41% were in 
favor; likely the push-back was due to the lack of available units for the displaced 
families, as seen in Figures 3.9 and 3.10.121  
Both the Greater Cincinnati Savings and Loan Exchange and the Citizen’s 
Protection Association took out advertisements in the days leading up to the election 
to dissuade voters from approving this bond issue on the grounds that there was no 
present provision for over 9,000 displaced families. While their claims were not purely 
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based on concern for these displaced Cincinnatians—Figure 3.9 explains that the 
10,000 or so uprooted families would likely move into new areas, causing greater tax 
problems for the property owner, and the need for slum clearance again in an almost 
endless cycle—it does show the thought processes that were occurring at that time.122 
With the narrow passage of the bond issue, the city of Cincinnati moved 
forward with the Kenyon-Barr redevelopment. The Master Plan for the 
Redevelopment of Kenyon-Barr Urban Renewal Area was published in July 1959 after 
three years of exhaustive studies.123 
 The Kenyon-Barr Plan proposed to redevelop the entire 435-acre tract along 
the lines originally suggested by the 1948 Master Plan: commercial and industrial uses 
in the 296-acres below the Millcreek Expressway and mixed-income residential use 
above the expressway.124 This would also come at the price of complete eradication of 
Cincinnati’s oldest black neighborhood. Planners designated the area that was planned 
for industrial development, “Kenyon Barr I” which was later rebranded by the City as 
“Queensgate I” and the 117-acre site that lay above the expressway (the residential 
section) as “Kenyon Barr II” which was also rebranded later as “Queensgate II”.125  
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Figure 3.9. Opposition to the Redevelopment or “Kenyon-Barr” Bond Issue by the Greater Cincinnati 
Savings and Loan Exchange. From the Cincinnati Enquirer, November 2, 1956, page 12 
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Figure 3.10. Opposition to the Redevelopment or “Kenyon-Barr” Bond Issue by the Citizen’s Protection 
Association. From the Cincinnati Enquirer, November 3, 1956, page 30 
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 Despite the number of dwellings and businesses to be eliminated and the 
number of people to be displaced—five times as many as those displaced by Laurel-
Richmond project—little resistance came from the neighborhood residents. In fact, the 
Kenyon-Barr project likely would not have been successful without the support of the 
residents of the West End. As quoted in Contested Ground: 
The people in the suburbs voted it down. They didn’t want the black and the 
poor moving in their direction. But the people in the downtown area were a 
real voting block. They voted themselves out of their homes and invited the 
bulldozer in. [But] they didn’t know what was happening to them...I remember 
hearing at the time that the people down there were promised that they’d have 
the first chance to come back and they would be helped to be resettled. All that 
was paper stuff. It was just inducement to get the area cleared.126 
 
This inducement worked partly because of the reality of life in Kenyon-Barr. 
The housing conditions in the area were truly dreadful. Only four of the 
neighborhood’s 2,800 residential structures were without building code violations, all 
but twenty-three had several structural problems, 70% were deemed fire hazards, half 
had inadequate sanitary facilities, and 2/3 were deemed “over-crowded.” The promise 
of better housing was undoubtedly attractive.127 Yet, this is only half of the story. In 
addition to the poor housing and structural conditions coldly described in The Master 
Plan for the Redevelopment of Kenyon-Barr Urban Renewal Area is the inventory of 
the units of use: 
 Units of use, excluding vacant lots, may be summarized as follows: 
10,295 dwelling units, 201 commercial and industrial concerns, 137 food 
stores, 118 bars and restaurants, 86 barber shops and beauty parlors, 82 
truckers, 10 public and parochial schools, 80 churches, 54 auto service shops, 
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46 clothing stores, 42 professional offices, 37 produce companies, 32 furniture 
stores, 29 vacant stores, 26 pawn shops, 25 electric repair and service shops, 24 
dry cleaners, 18 printers, 11 drug stores, 10 rooming houses, 6 funeral homes, 
5 insurance companies for a total of 11,364 units of use in buildings. With an 
additional 171 vacant lots, the total number of units equals 11,535.128 
 
 
This shows that at the time of urban renewal, the West End, or even the smaller 
subsection named “Kenyon-Barr”, was not a socially-, culturally-, or politically-
lifeless area. It was a thriving neighborhood which contained 25,737 residents, 98% of 
whom were non-white129. This can be seen in Figures 3.11 – 3.15, and additional 
photos can be seen in Appendix A. (These images were taken by photographers to 
meet the conditions set by the Department of Urban Renewal to document the 
conditions of the property within the Kenyon-Barr renewal area.) 
 At the suggestion of federal officials, the city decided to execute the Kenyon-
Barr Urban Renewal Plan in phases, over a period of years. The industrial 
redevelopment of Queensgate I (Kenyon-Barr I, as discussed above) was to be carried 
out first, and then followed immediately by the residential redevelopment of 
Queensgate II (Kenyon-Barr II). 130 
 With this plan in place, the acquisition of property in Queensgate I began in 
earnest in 1960 after the Federal Government approved the $16.3 million fund 
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package to start the Queensgate I portion on January 13.131 By February 17, the 
Cincinnati City Council approved a relocation payment policy for the residents of 
Kenyon-Barr. The regulations, conforming to provisions of the most current Housing 
Act, allowed displaced families up to $200 for moving expenses and businesses as 
much as $3000.132 In 1962, a quarter of the area had been acquired and cleared. The 
city of Cincinnati then began selling off parcels of Queensgate I, chiefly to 
commercial firms, while continuing to acquire the rest of the tract. In all, the cost to 
the city and federal government was $43 million to acquire, clear, and redevelop 
Queensgate I for industrial use. 
By 1965, the area south of the Millcreek Expressway—Queensgate I—had 
been cleared of houses and was being gradually resold to corporations involved in 
wholesaling, warehousing, industrial and construction supply, and most notably 
commercial and industrial developers (Figure 3.16 and 3.17). The land was eventually 
resold to private corporations over a ten-year period for only $7.8 million. This entire 
process was completed in September 1972.133  
 What remained of the West End, as a residential neighborhood, was confined 
to a four-hundred-acre enclave lying between I-75 (the Millcreek Expressway) and 
Central Parkway. Options for housing were, obviously, limited. Park Town and 
Richmond Village provided new housing for 500 middle-class and lower-middle-class 
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families. The Stanley Rowe Apartments, built by the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing 
Authority (CMHA) soon after Park Town and Richmond Village were opened, 
provided an additional 436 units of brand-new elderly and family housing.  
On the other side of Linn Street, Laurel Homes and Lincoln Court provided another 
2,300 units of public housing (Laurel Homes and Lincoln Court are shown as “B” and 
“C” respectively on Figure 3.1). Further south, Queensgate II awaited clearance and 
redevelopment for a mixed-income residential community.134 
 What remains almost always forgotten in the celebration of the city’s success 
was that after almost forty years of city planning and urban redevelopment in this area, 
very little of the West End remained. More than half of the residential acreage had 
been sliced off, two-thirds of its housing had been eliminated, and around 75% of its 
population had been permanently displaced, scattered to Avondale, Evanston, Mt. 
Auburn, and a half-dozen other outlying areas. The slums of the West End were 
finally gone, but so too were most of the people and most of the institutions that made 
the neighborhood the social, cultural, and political center of Cincinnati’s black 
community.135 The slums of the West End had little place in the “city of tomorrow” 
brand that the city of Cincinnati was trying to advertise in the post-war era. Although 
many politicians, residents, and members of Cincinnati Planning Commission tried to 
forget this history, the image of the West End of previous years loomed large in the 
collective memory of Cincinnati’s black population. For them, the “shining new 
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neighborhoods” of the West End were a tarnished reminder of homes, neighbors, and a 
vital community, lost forever.136  
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Figure 3.11. 1119 Budd Street in June 1959. From the Cincinnati History Library and Archives, 1959 
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Figure 3.12. 658 Fourth Street in November 1959. From the Cincinnati History Library and Archives, 
1959 
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Figure 3.13. 633 Central Avenue in November 1959. From the Cincinnati History Library and 
Archives, 1959 
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Figure 3.14. 733 West Court Street in July 1959. From the Cincinnati History Library and Archives, 
1959 
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Figure 3.15. 412 George Street in August 1959. From the Cincinnati History Library and Archives, 
1959 
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Figure 3.16. Aerial view of Queensgate I area post-demolition. This image is looking south towards the 
Ohio River, with the Union Terminal in the lower left-hand portion of the image. From Cincinnati 
Progress 1964 Midyear Edition, Volume II, No.2, 1964 
 
 
Figure 3.17. Timeline of Queensgate I area, “From Slums- To Clearance- To- Opportunity.” From 
Cincinnati Progress 1964 Midyear Edition, Volume II, No.2, 1964 
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Conclusion 
 From 1950 – 1970, the construction of the Millcreek Expressway and the city’s 
urban renewal program eliminated between 13,147 and 22,354 low-cost dwellings in 
the West End, displacing a predominantly black, low-income population of between 
50,561 and 54,471.137 Residential redevelopment of West End sites that had been 
cleared by urban renewal produced only 1,038 units, housing 3,152 people. During a 
twenty-year period, therefore, the West End lost 75% of its population. With the 
eradication of so much housing, this loss of population was permanent.138 Only 8,115 
people lived in the West End in 2000 and this had decreased from 1990 when the 
population was 11,370.139 Only 6,627 people lived in the West End in 2010.140 
In some ways, the policies of the 1950s and 1960s resembled the much earlier 
strategy emphasizing elimination rather than construction because the urban 
redevelopment and highway building projects of this era often destroyed the city’s 
poorest neighborhoods. Little was done to guarantee that those displaced would find 
better neighborhoods. As a result, bulldozers razed the city’s most dilapidated slum 
areas, worsening the housing shortage, which led to overcrowding and slum formation 
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in other parts of Cincinnati as the private real estate marked proved incapable of 
providing good housing for needy blacks.141 
 In 1966, the National Commission on Urban Problems cited a survey of 
projects, noting that of 1,155 projects, 67% were predominantly residential before 
urban renewal, but only 43% were residential afterward. The commission also pointed 
out that most of the residences built in redeveloped areas were too expensive for the 
former occupants. The result, according to the critics was that Title I of the Housing 
Act of 1949 dispersed slum dwellers to other areas that then became slums. For the 
displaced, urban renewal began to appear as a form of class and race warfare. Because 
of the frequency of government-cleared tracts in African-American neighborhoods, 
critics lambasted urban renewal as “Negro removal.” Other ethnic groups, however, 
suffered from urban redevelopment as well. In one of the most extreme cases of 
displacement, Los Angeles officials cleared thousands of Mexican Americans from the 
Bunker Hill neighborhood next to downtown and from Chavez Ravine, a 315- acre 
tract originally planned for public housing but eventually given to the Los Angeles 
Dodgers, who built a baseball stadium there. Such infamous deeds fueled the wrath of 
urban renewal’s detractors.142  
From the right, economist Martin Anderson wrote a scathing review of the 
program, The Federal Bulldozer, which attacked the principle that government could 
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take away one person’s property and give it to another for private gain.143 In response 
to the disrepute into which public housing had fallen and the chaos of the new private 
construction programs created as an alternative, President Richard M. Nixon imposed 
a moratorium on all federal housing programs in 1973.144  
 For a rising generation of black leaders, however, the “New West End” was to 
become a symbol of pain inflicted and promises broken by a white establishment 
determined to rebuild the old West End in its own image. By the mid-1960s, these new 
leaders had come to the fore, and the West End was mobilizing to defend and develop 
itself on its own terms. The era of metropolitan planning, housing reform, and urban 
renewal had passed. The era of neighborhood protest and participation had begun.145 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE WEST END TODAY: WHAT’S CHANGED? WHAT’S CHANGING? 
 
The history of the West End did not end with the demolition of the 
neighborhood. Throughout the rest of the 1960s tensions in Cincinnati regarding race 
and civil rights were at a boiling point, culminating in riots in 1968, similar to many 
other major cities in the United States. Through the next four decades, the West End 
also saw continued population decline similar to other central neighborhoods in 
Cincinnati. Unlike other neighborhoods close to the Central Business District, such as 
Over-the-Rhine, the West End has not seen the rapid redevelopment that started in 
2003 with the backing of the Cincinnati City Center Development Corporation 
(3CDC) and the city of Cincinnati. Not until the decision to place a professional soccer 
stadium in the heart of the West End in May 2018, has the West End faced 
development pressures similar to those seen during urban renewal. This new 
development in their neighborhood is leaving West End residents to wonder if this 
process of “urban redevelopment” is going to start again. 
This chapter is divided into three sections: Over-the-Rhine and 3CDC; 
CityLink and; FC Cincinnati Stadium. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: (1) to 
look at the effects resulting from development pressures in neighboring Over-the-
Rhine and; (2) to see how these effects are impacting the current planning decisions in 
the West End, including development pressures resulting from the decision to place a 
Major League Soccer stadium for the FC Cincinnati team in the West End. 
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Over-the-Rhine and 3CDC 
In order to understand the current development pressures in the West End, it is 
important to look at the development pressures in the neighborhood immediately east 
of the West End: Over-the-Rhine. 
In 2009, the Over-the-Rhine (OTR) neighborhood in Cincinnati topped 
Compton, the neighborhood in Los Angeles, for the most dangerous neighborhood in 
the United States. After years of population decline and an increase in crime, the 
neighborhood was at a crisis point. Today Over-the-Rhine boasts, “…two-hour lines 
for organic fried chicken…condominiums going for $500,000, [and] office rents 
[which] rival those in the high-rises of the Central Business District.”146 While OTR 
has a long and tumultuous history, the redevelopment of the neighborhood is directly 
impacting the current development pressures that are being thrust upon the West End. 
Officially founded in 1790 by the governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur 
St. Clair, Losantiville was to become the county seat of Hamilton County. St. Clair 
detested the name and he changed it to Cincinnati after the Roman solider, 
Cincinnatus, and the City of Cincinnati was born (See Figure 4.1).147 After it’s official 
founding in 1790, the city’s population swelled with the addition of two hundred and 
fifty families, who arrived later that year. This increased the town’s population to 
nearly seven hundred people. Law and order remained absent from Cincinnati during  
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Figure 4.1. “Cincinnati in 1802” An early rendering of Cincinnati along with the first prominent 
citizens to inhabit the banks near the Ohio River. The drastic change in topography can also be 
seen in the background, giving Cincinnati the nickname “The City of Seven Hills.” From the 
Queen City in 1869 by George E. Stevens, Archives and Rare Book Library, University of 
Cincinnati 
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its early years. The settlers organized a court and hired a sheriff, but soldiers from Fort 
Washington, located in the center of the community, routinely had to establish martial 
law in the city. Contributing to this lawlessness, many of the residents distilled 
whiskey from their corn crops and sold it to the local soldiers. Despite this lack of 
order and the various safety concerns, settlers continued to come to the town. They 
believed that they could make their fortunes by providing the soldiers and civilians 
traveling down the Ohio River with supplies. By the summer of 1792, there were 
thirty warehouses in Cincinnati to meet these needs.148 
During the early nineteenth century Cincinnati continued to grow. The Ohio 
River provided Cincinnati residents with numerous business opportunities. Farmers 
brought their crops to the city to send down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New 
Orleans, Louisiana—one of Ohio’s major markets.149 In the early 1800s, Cincinnati 
developed into an important meatpacking center. Farmers brought their livestock to 
the city, where it was slaughtered, processed, and sold to western settlers or shipped to 
various markets. Cincinnati was becoming the pork-processing center of the United 
States, and because of the city’s association with meatpacking, the city became known 
as the “Porkopolis” of the United States.150   
By 1840, forty-eight pork-packing houses employed 1,200 men (mainly first 
and second-generation German immigrants) and were producing more than $3 million 
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in packed pork annually. Few of these pigs were actually raised within the city limits, 
most were being raised on farms on the outskirts of the city and some as far away as 
Columbus, Ohio (approximately 125 miles from Cincinnati). At the height of 
Cincinnati’s dominance of the packed-pork industry, pigs had essentially taken over 
the city (Figure 4.2). Nicholas Woods, a special correspondent from the Times of 
London reported, “They [the pigs] pervade the whole place—the very gutters are 
congested with them, and a sort of dull monotony of pigs is visible everywhere.”151 
The majority of these pork-packing houses were located in Cincinnati’s Over-
the-Rhine neighborhood. Located immediately north of Cincinnati’s Central Business 
District on Third and Fourth Streets, the cost of land in OTR was originally much 
lower due to its low level of demand. This low cost of land allowed for a variety of 
industries, including the pork-packing and beer-brewing, allowed warehouses to start 
in the neighborhood, leading to the neighborhood’s eventual increase in population 
and density. 
Additionally, OTR’s location north of the Miami and Erie Canal further 
isolated the neighborhood from the business sector. First and second-generation 
immigrants (mainly German) found homes in the area and due to the neighborhood’s 
German makeup, the neighborhood was often considered the “foreign” part of the city 
and it “…seemed to many that crossing the Miami and Erie Canal was like crossing 
the Rhine River into Germany,” hence the namesake Over-the-Rhine.152 
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Figure 4.2. “Journey to the Slaughter-house.” By the 1840s, Cincinnati was the pork-packing center in 
the United States, producing more than $3 million in packaged pork annually. The majority of these 
“pork houses” were located in Over-the-Rhine along with the mainly first- and second-generation 
German immigrants who worked in the slaughterhouses. From Harper’s Weekly, 1860 as reprinted in 
Cincinnati Magazine, November 14, 2016  
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In 1850, 30,000 Germans were living within Cincinnati’s city limits, 
approximately 19% of the total population in the city. The majority of these Germans 
were living or at least working in OTR, with major social ties to the neighborhood 
such as churches, schools, and community centers.153 In 1851, Saint Paul’s German 
Evangelical Protestant Church located at 1429 Race Street officially opened. The 
church was a vital part of the cityscape when it was built, being one of five Protestant 
churches in the neighborhood. The church was built mainly as a response to a divide 
in the congregation of the North German Lutheran Church, “…when Heinrich Suhr 
was elected to the preacher’s office in 1845 instead of his rival Robert Clemen…the 
supporters of Clemen founded St. Paul’s and construction began.” The congregation 
officially moved into the new church in 1851.154 
In 1866, the K. K. B’nai Yeshurun (Isaac M. Wise Temple) also known as the 
Plum Street Temple opened to a growing Jewish congregation in Cincinnati. The 
congregation had already gained a national prominence because of their rabbi, Isaac 
Mayer Wise. Due to Rabbi Wise’s “energy and vision” the congregation and 
Cincinnati were quickly becoming a center of national Jewish life. The building was 
designed by James Key Wilson, a prominent American architect. He designed the 
building to reflect a synagogue-architectural style that had emerged in Germany in the 
nineteenth century—a Byzantine-Moorish style. The style, “reflects Rabbi Wise’s 
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optimism that the developing American-Jewish experience would be the next Golden 
Age.”155 
In 1868, Saint John’s German Protestant Church located at 1205 Elm Street, 
officially opened. St. John’s was Cincinnati’s first German congregation, organized in 
1814 by Joseph Zaeslin who gathered both German Protestants and Catholics as the 
German Evangelical Lutheran and Reformed Church. The group was “independent” 
and not affiliated with any established denomination. In 1824, Catholic members left 
when a priest who could preach in German arrived in Cincinnati. In 1829, the 
remainder of the original congregation incorporated officially as St. John’s German 
Protestant Church with stipulations that services and records were to be in German. By 
1868 the congregation, Cincinnati’s leading German Protestant congregation, moved 
into the building on Elm Street after they outgrew their previous space on Third 
Street.156 Obviously, religion and the structures needed to support these congregation 
were integral in changing the landscape of the neighborhood as well. 
By 1875, the pork-packing industry in Cincinnati had shifted to Chicago, 
which out-paced Cincinnati in pork production after the Civil War. OTR replaced this 
industry by becoming an entertainment center. 157  
German American culture was all along Vine Street. At its peak, the street 
included more than fifty saloons and five theaters…the Vine Street 
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entertainment district was a major tourist attraction with a national, as well as 
local, reputation.158 
 
Moving into the twentieth century, OTR saw its first major population decline 
during World War I and the 1920s. Anti-German sentiments combined with 
Prohibition, caused many Germans and their families to disperse into the surrounding, 
up-and-coming subdivisions further away from the city center out of fear and a need 
for work. Breweries in the area were closed, associated warehouses were switched to 
selling other products, Vine Street became a “…tawdry remnant of its former self”, 
and Over-the-Rhine became an aging district of industry and working-class housing.159 
By the 1950s only 25,000 people were living in OTR, a 37.5% drop in 
population from 1920. During this time, the old housing stock attracted low-income 
residents from Appalachia and blacks displaced by urban renewal projects in nearby 
neighborhoods, such as the West End, CUF (Clifton Heights, University Heights, 
Fairview), Coryville, and Mt. Auburn. Additionally, OTR received very little funding 
or urban renewal work due to its central location: 
City planners did not think of it as a ‘rock-bottom slum’ like the West End, nor 
was it in the path of a new expressway. Further, the ‘deterioration’ in Over-the-
Rhine did not threaten any nearby communities. So the city’s limited renewal 
funds were consigned, instead, to Coryville and Avondale where ‘blight’ might 
affect adjoining, un-deteriorated neighborhoods. 160 
 
In other words, since “blighted” suburbs surrounded Over-the-Rhine, the city of 
Cincinnati took Urban Renewal funds and used them in other neighborhoods such as 
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the West End, CUF, Coryville, etc. since those neighborhoods bordered “non-
blighted” suburbs. After the lack of urban renewal in OTR, the housing stock and the 
population continued to decline.161 
From 1990 – 2000 the total population in OTR decreased 20% with only 7,600 
people calling Over-the-Rhine home by 2000. The problems and racial tensions came 
to a front in OTR on April 7, 2001. A Cincinnati police officer, Steven Roach, who 
was white, chased 19-year-old Timothy Thomas, who was black and wanted on 
fourteen minor warrants mostly for traffic violations. The chase ended in an alley 
behind Vine Street, the physical and emotional center of OTR, where Roach shot 
Thomas who turned out to be unarmed. The killing was the 15th of an African-
American at the hands of Cincinnati police in five years, ignited days of civil unrest, 
“…culminating in roaming bands pulling motorists from their cars, looting stores, and 
setting them on fire and tense showdowns between police and protestors.” Mayor 
Charlie Luken declared a state of emergency and a citywide curfew was put in place 
that lasted for four nights and this became the major catalyst for the changes in Over-
the-Rhine.  
In 2003, Mayor Luken decided something needed to be done in order to 
resurrect the neighborhood. As it was directly north of the Central Business District, 
he recognized that Cincinnati could not survive if OTR was not thriving. Thus, he 
helped to develop Cincinnati Center City Development Corporation (3CDC), a quasi 
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private-public corporation with the financial backing of the City of Cincinnati and 
Proctor & Gamble (P&G). 162  
At this time OTR contained over 500 vacant buildings and over 700 vacant 
lots. 3CDC decided the best practice would to be to begin land-banking property in 
OTR and begin small-scale development.163 3CDC first began acquiring and land-
banking “blighted” and “troubled” properties. Initially, 3CDC invested over $27 
million in private funds to buy 200 buildings and 170 vacant parcels centered on 
Washington Park. Included in those purchases were several notorious bars and 
carryout liquor stores that were centers of crime and drug dealing.164 
Since 2004, nearly $1.4 billion has been invested in redevelopment and new 
construction projects that 3CDC has been involved with in downtown Cincinnati and 
Over-the-Rhine.165 As of 2016, this included: restoring 144 buildings, including 
housing and street-front commercial establishments; constructing fifty new buildings; 
adding 1,113 housing units (condominiums, apartments, and townhouses); providing 
320 shelter beds; adding 156 hotel rooms; creating 845,000 square feet of commercial 
space; adding 2,700 parking spaces; revitalizing ten acres of parks, including 
Washington Park and Fountain Square; incentivizing millions of dollars in streetscape 
improvements, and; a total of 842 million dollars of new money has been invested in 
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downtown and Over-the-Rhine, creating over 2,500 jobs and 1,100 housing units as a 
result (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) 166  
Yet despite this improvement in the number of housing units and commercial 
space, Over-the-Rhine has seen a continued population decrease. As of 2017, the total 
population of OTR was 2,081 with a median age of the residents being 32.167 In 
comparison the total population of the West End was slightly higher at 3,060 with a 
median age of the residents being 30.168 The main difference in this current population 
comparison is the median housing value and the median income of the residents in 
both neighborhoods. In 2017 in Over-the-Rhine, the median housing value was 
$208,000 and the median income was $80,876.26. 169 While in the West End, the 
median housing value was $120,200 and the median income was $12,808. 170 The 
correlation between these two neighborhoods can be seen clearly. With the investment 
made in Over-the-Rhine, the neighborhood has seen a decrease in population but an 
increase in median household income and housing values, likely due to the 
redeveloped housing stock in the neighborhood. In the West End, a once comparable 
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neighborhood to Over-the-Rhine, has not seen this rapid redevelopment and the 
housing values and household incomes are significantly lower in comparison ($87,800 
for housing values and $68,068.26 for median income), showing that without this 
redevelopment, real estate values in the West End will continue to decline as a newly 
renovated neighborhood sits to its immediate east.171,172 
 
CityLink 
 With the history of disinvestment and then redevelopment of Over-the-Rhine, 
where was the West End? Largely ignored. There was no active land banking 
occurring in the neighborhood as of 2019 by 3CDC or the city of Cincinnati. The 
major development in the area occurred in 2005. This project, CityLink, was 
controversial in nature and was challenged all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court.173 
 CityLink was a response to the persistent problem of poverty within the city of 
Cincinnati. According to CityLink’s website, U.S. Census data, and the Ohio 
Development Agency’s Ohio Poverty Report in 2018, 29.9% of Cincinnatians live in 
poverty, approximately 85,000 individuals. Nationally, Cincinnati is among the top 
fifteen poorest cities in the country with a population of 250,000 or more. This means 
that approximately one in three Cincinnatians fall below the poverty line, and the 
City’s poverty rate is almost twice the national average. By recognizing the need to 
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reverse the trend of poverty in Cincinnati, five non-profit organizations and local 
churches came together to integrate a multitude of social services. The founding 
organization recognized that often their attempts to coordinate services often fell short 
because clients found it difficult to navigate between services. 174  
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Figure 4.3. Duncanson lofts at 1201-1209 Vine Street in Over-the-Rhine, Cincinnati before renovation. 
From “3CDC Completed Projects,” photo archive, 2005 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Duncanson lofts at 1201-1209 Vine Street in Over-the-Rhine, Cincinnati after renovation. 
From “A Photographer Shows Us All Sides to Cincinnati,” National Trust for Historic Preservation 
website, photos by Phil Armstrong, 2018 
  
  106 
Included in this social service “shopping mall” are the following: SmartMoney, 
Cincinnati Public Schools, Cincinnati State Technical and Community College, 
Changing Gears, 4C for Children, Beech Acres, Catholic Charities, Eve Center, 
Freestore Foodbank, the Legal Aid Society, and the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. 
Programs and services include employment assistance, mentoring, job-readiness 
programs, financial services, health and wellness programs, legal assistance, 
transportation, on-site child care, and referrals to housing programs.175 CityLink is 
supported by grants from churches, corporations, and foundations. It has an annual 
operating budget of about $1.5 million. 176 
Despite all the positive things that are now being provided by the CityLink 
Center, the neighborhood was not originally supportive of the plans. As reported in 
2005 when the first iterations of the plans were being announced, CityLink was 
considered a project that would either, “...save the West End or kill it.” It was planned 
at the time to be the largest private social services offering in the city with the goal of 
being a “one-stop social service mall, where the city’s poor could receive health care, 
job training, drug counseling, and more.” The proposed property sat on a once vacant 
lot and industrial building, at the corner of Lynn and Bank Streets. West End residents 
feared that CityLink would make their neighborhood a magnet for all of the poor in 
Cincinnati, lowering property values and causing crime to increase. Citizens of the 
West End took their issues to a public meeting with CityLink and the West End 
Community Council, protesting the plans of the organization and placing “No 
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CityLink” signs around the neighborhood (Figure 4.5). Critics also theorized that the 
CityLink project was the city of Cincinnati’s way of pushing the poor from the 
thriving Over-the-Rhine neighborhood to the West End.177  
Critics of CityLink originally took the issue to court in 2006 to stop the center 
from being built. In 2008, the Ohio Supreme court declined to hear an appeal of a 
2007 Ohio First District Court of Appeals ruling that upheld the zoning permit that 
allowed the center to be built.178 With the final approval for the CityLink facility, 
construction started in 2011 and opened in October 2012; CityLink officially launched 
in January 2013 at the corner of Lynn and Bank Streets in the West End. 179 This 
decision to place the CityLink Center in the West End is similar to the decisions in the 
1948 Master Plan: The West End is expendable land which can be used for the 
betterment of the city of Cincinnati, regardless of the opinions of the West End 
residents. 
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Figure 4.5. “No CityLink, Not Near Our Schools!” These signs were posted all over the West End 
neighborhood after the proposal of putting the social services center in the area. From “Ruling on 
CityLink is Absurdly Wrong,” 2006  
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FC Cincinnati Stadium 
 On August 12, 2015, Futbol Club (FC) Cincinnati was announced as a club in 
the United Soccer League (USL) for the 2016 season. At the time, USL was a third-
division soccer league, but from the founding it was intended that the team would 
eventually apply for a bid to become a Major League Soccer (MLS) expansion team, 
moving the team from a third-division placement to the highest level of professional 
soccer in the United States. Jeff Berding was announced as the president and general 
manager in 2016 followed by Carl Lindner III, CEO of American Financial Group, as 
the majority owner of the team. On April 9, 2016, FC Cincinnati played its first home 
game before 14,658 fans, beating Charlotte Independence 2-1.180  
The club also began its contract at the University of Cincinnati at the time of 
its founding to play games at the university’s Nippert Stadium, which had recently 
expanded, allowing for a major-league sized soccer field.181  On October 2, 2016, FC 
Cincinnati finished third in the Eastern Conference. They hosted the Charleston 
Battery in a playoff match, but lost in extra time, ending the team’s inaugural season 
with a 16-6-8 record. 182 
In November 2016, FC Cincinnati officials started looking for a site for a new 
soccer-only stadium, one of the requirements for the MLS expansion team. They 
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reportedly were looking for a twenty-acre site in which to build.183 On November 29, 
MLS Commissioner, Dan Garber visited Cincinnati (Figure 4.6). The visit was to 
show Garber why Cincinnati deserved to have FC Cincinnati expanded as an MLS 
franchise. Garber also fielded questions from FC Cincinnati supporters at the 
Woodward Theater in Over-the-Rhine, before visiting other FC Cincinnati “themed” 
establishments in the neighborhood, including Rhinehaus. While an interesting choice 
since the team was not playing games in the area, OTR is a common highlight shown 
off by the city as an example of its recent urban redevelopment. 184 
 In January 2017, the Cincinnati Enquirer reported that FC Cincinnati was 
considering five possible sites in order to build the stadium, including the 
neighborhood of Oakley and Newport, KY. The team did not provide comment about 
the decision of building a stadium in any of the proposed locations but in late May 
2017 the team narrowed its list of potential stadium sites to three. One was Oakley,  
another was Newport, and the final location was in the West End, on the site of 
Cincinnati Public Schools’ Stargel Stadium, behind Robert A. Taft IT High School 
(the same Robert A. Taft who helped write and pass the 1949 Housing Act). The 
team’s officials confirmed the possible neighborhood locations at that time, but did not 
confirm any specific sites in the proposed neighborhoods.185 
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Figure 4.6. MLS Commissioner, Don Garber, holding an FC Cincinnati scarf during his 2016 visit to 
the city 186  
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On June 12, 2017, the team unveiled the proposed stadium renderings for a 
soccer-specific stadium (Figure 4.7). The design by Dan Meis of MEIS Architects 
took inspiration from the Allianz Arena, home to German Bundesliga team, Bayern 
Munich.187 Both General Manager, Jeff Berding, and principal owner, Carl Lindner 
III, noted their desire to keep the stadium on the Cincinnati side of the river at this 
event, placing doubts on the possible Newport, KY location. Berding also commented 
that the team hoped to break ground by early spring 2018 with the stadium opening in 
2020. 188 
In October of the same year, the team lost 3-0 to the Tampa Bay Rowdies in 
the first round of the USL Playoffs, ending the team’s second season 12-10-10. 
Approximately one month later, on November 27, 2017, with city elections having 
concluded, the Cincinnati City Council voted 5-3 in favor to spend $36 million in 
infrastructure costs and tax incentives for a soccer-specific stadium within city limits,  
which finalized FC Cincinnati’s MLS bid. The ordinance singled out the Oakley site 
but included language supporting any site in the city that the team would pick. The  
club also got Hamilton County to commit to pay for a $15 million, 1,000-vehicle 
garage as part of the incentive package.189  
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Figure 4.7. Rendering of the proposed FC Cincinnati stadium. From MEIS Architects, Featured Work, 
2017  
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In December 2017, the city of Cincinnati requested a $10 million grant from 
the state of Ohio for roads and other infrastructure for a soccer stadium. This amount 
was later reduced to $4 million. On December 6, FC Cincinnati made its formal pitch 
to MLS to become an expansion franchise. On the same day the city of Miami, Florida 
is named as one of the teams that would be awarded an expansion deal, but MLS 
waited on picking the other team, naming Sacramento, Detroit, Nashville, and 
Cincinnati as teams that were in the running for a possible expansion franchise. 
On December 20, 2017, the MLS announced that it would vote on two 
additional expansion franchises joining the league as early as 2019. On January 22, 
2018, word emerged that FC Cincinnati had signed options on land in the West End. 
Although there were no specifics about precisely where the stadium would be located 
in the neighborhood, residents immediately respond with protests (Figure 4.7).190 
On February 13, 2018, the team disclosed that it wanted to swap land with 
Cincinnati Public Schools (CPS), taking Stargel Stadium but building a new stadium 
across from Taft IT High School for CPS’ use at Ezzard Charles Drive and John 
Street. On March 15, the CPS Board declined to meet with the team’s deadline for a 
deal on a West End land-swap for a stadium, thus on March 17, 2018 the team issued a 
statement that it would be abandoning any plans to build in the West End, saying the 
payments CPS demanded in lieu of taxes were too high. City officials also made a 
statement saying that they would press on with sites in Oakley and Newport. Yet more 
discussion occurred as the political decisions changed. On March 26, the West End 
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Community Council sent an outline of a proposed community benefits agreement to 
the team.191 On March 28, 2018 Mayor of Cincinnati, John Cranley, reasserted  
his support for the West End site, stating that failing to put the stadium in the 
neighborhood would “be tragic.”192 
On April 5, 2018, Berding announced that the Oakley site was out of 
contention and the financial terms for the site in Newport, KY remained uncertain, 
putting the stadium at risk of having no location with the MLS announcement 
looming. But on April 10, the CPS Board approved a land swap with FC Cincinnati, 
letting the team build on the site of CPS’ Stargel Stadium in exchange for a new CPS 
stadium near Taft IT High School and $25 million in payments in lieu of taxes on the 
new soccer stadium. The next day, April 16, some West End representatives approved 
a community benefits agreement with the team. The Cincinnati City Council, meeting 
in special session, approved the West End development plan by a 5-4 vote. The 
following day, April 17, 2018, the president of the West End Community Council 
faced possible impeachment for signing a tentative community benefits agreement  
with FC Cincinnati despite overwhelming disapproval of the deal by the full 
council.193  
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Figure 4.8. West End residents and local stakeholders rally and protest against placing a soccer stadium 
for FC Cincinnati in their neighborhood, 2018 194  
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On May 16, FC Cincinnati, the West End Community Council, and the Greater 
Cincinnati Redevelopment Authority negotiated for nine hours to agree on an 
amended community benefits agreement. The amended agreement included several 
changes to the original provisions, including adding the West End Community 
Council as a full party to the contract instead of a third-party beneficiary. Additionally, 
the draft agreement made several promises to the community that included: the team is 
to pay $100,000 annually for thirty years to West End organizations; the team will 
transfer options it holds on West End land to a redevelopment authority to build 
“affordable mixed-income market-rate housing”; prevailing wages will be paid to 
stadium construction workers; in construction, the team will commit to hiring twenty-
five percent minority-owned businesses, seven percent women-owned businesses, and 
thirty percent small businesses; West End businesses will be preferred for any 
contract; the team will work to give those in low-income areas, including the West 
End, first chance at jobs, including those with criminal records; the team will consult 
with the community to provide protections in regard to parking, stadium design, 
security, beautification and the creation of a compliant process; a $20,000 
entrepreneurship program at Mortar, a minority-owned business development service, 
based in Over-the-Rhine, will be offered to West End residents; a scholarship program 
will be established for students in West End schools; and a West End Athletic 
Association will be formed to promote athletics in the neighborhood.  The Cincinnati 
City Council voted 7-0 minutes after the deal was completed in order to accept the 
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provision.  This cleared away the last remaining local approval needed before MLS 
could act on FC Cincinnati’s expansion application.195 
On May 29, 2018, fans gathered at Rhinegeist Brewery in Over-the-Rhine and 
at Fountain Square in the CBD to hear an announcement from MLS Commissioner 
Don Garber. The week prior, Mayor John Cranley, declared May 29th “Orange and 
Blue Day,” encouraging fans to wear the blue and orange colors of FC Cincinnati. 
Cranley, along with Garber, FC Cincinnati majority owner Carl Lindner III, and team 
President and General Manager Jeff Berding were scheduled to speak, sparking 
rumors that the announcement for FC Cincinnati’s expansion would be given at this 
event (Figure 4.8).196 
The following day, May 30, the Cincinnati Enquirer dedicated its entire front 
page to the team’s announcement as a new MLS franchise: “GOAL! Years long push 
to join top soccer league in US, Canada pays off,” the title read. With a full-page letter 
from Carl Lindner III on the inside page and seven additional full pages dedicated to 
the news, it was obviously the city’s top story.197 In December 2018, the city had an 
official groundbreaking ceremony to commemorate the start of construction. Hundreds 
of Cincinnatians gathered with orange plastic shovels in hand to “Be a part of history,” 
a new marketing campaign the team has recently launched.198 Yet the FC Cincinnati 
expansion bid has left many West End residents to wonder: What will another city-
                                                
195 Cameron Knight, “Soccer club, neighbors have a deal,” Cincinnati Enquirer, May 17, 2018. 
 
196 Patrick Brennan, “FC Cincinnati prepares for MLS bid announcement,” Cincinnati Enquirer, May 
29, 2018. 
 
197 Cincinnati Enquirer, May 30, 2018. 
 
198 “FC Cincinnati breaks ground on new stadium,” Cincinnati Enquirer, December 18, 2018. 
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driven redevelopment project change in the West End? What about the history that has 
already been lost? 
 
Conclusion   
 These questions cannot be answered today. The question of what will another 
city-driven redevelopment project change in the West End is something that will have 
to be observed carefully over the next decades. It is likely that the change will involve 
commercial ventures. 
  As discussed earlier, many of the redevelopment pressures resulting in the 
redevelopment of the Over-the-Rhine neighborhood are now beginning to push into 
the West End as seen with the FC Cincinnati stadium. By placing the stadium here, it 
is seemingly going into “underutilized” land, however currently the West End is home 
to a number of community and cultural organizations including: museums—The Betts 
House (Ohio’s oldest brick building) and the Cincinnati Fire Museum, local business 
and restaurants—including Hook Fish & Chicken, Ollie’s Trolley, Cee Kay Beauty 
Supply, and Ferguson Plumbing Supply, and religious sites—such as the West End 
Community Church, Revelation Missionary Baptist Church, Memorial Baptist 
Church, St. Joseph Church, St. Mark Christian Fellowship, and St. Luke Baptist 
Church. Additionally, the West End has a number of Cincinnati Public Schools 
(Robert A. Taft IT High School, Hays-Porter Elementary School), a parochial school 
(St. Joseph’s Catholic School), a number of community center buildings, including a 
head start and a YMCA, a Cincinnati Police District Building, Artonomy—an art 
gallery, and a number of playgrounds and recreation areas. While the new stadium will 
  120 
be used to generate more money from tourism and entertainment in order to support 
development projects, starting with the stadium before plans and discussions about the 
“required” mixed-income and affordable housing element of the projects. 
The placement of the new stadium is immediately adjacent to the unofficial 
dividing line between the West End and Over-the-Rhine as well (Figure 4.10). In 
yellow, we can see the new FC Cincinnati stadium site highlighted, with Central 
Parkway to the immediate east. This road divides the West End and OTR; everything 
to the east of Central Parkway is the West End and everything to the west is Over-the-
Rhine and then the CBD further south. By connecting the stadium site to Central 
Parkway, the flow of people from Over-the-Rhine can seamless move into the West 
End for the FC Cincinnati games, as Central Parkway is often seen as a physical 
“barrier” between these two neighborhoods. The flow of development will seemingly 
also occur much easier once these two areas have been reconnected. 
 This is nothing new in the West End. In the early master planning documents, 
the city of Cincinnati wanted to use the West End for its expanding industrial needs 
and need for radial thoroughfares. This land was seen as “expendable” for the 
betterment of the CBD. Today, this is still occurring in what could have been the 
social, cultural, and political center of black life in Cincinnati. Today it has been 
destroyed through urban renewal, seeing periods of white-flight and decades of 
disinvestment. Today developers have begun to “rebrand” the West End as “OTR 
West” to drive up property values based on OTR’s well-known reputation. Unlike 
previous efforts, the West End is not taking this new city investment and 
redevelopment lying down. “We don’t want this neighborhood to become OTR 2.0,” 
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stated Tia Brown, a spokesperson for the Seven Hills Neighborhood Houses (SHNH). 
The Port (formerly the Greater Cincinnati Redevelopment Authority) will partner with 
SHNH during its negotiations with the West End Community Council, and FC 
Cincinnati, including signing a memorandum of understanding in October 2018 that 
will help ensure development in the West End includes a balanced mix of affordable 
and low-income housing.199 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
199 Randy Tucker, “The Port teams with West End group to help curb gentrification near FC Cincinnati 
stadium,” Cincinnati Enquirer, October 9, 2018. 
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Figure 4.9. MLS Announcement Day with important stake holders of FC Cincinnati; from left, Jeff 
Berding, FC Cincinnati President and General Manager, Don Garber, MLS Commissioner, Carl 
Lindner III, FC Cincinnati majority owner, and John Cranley, Mayor of Cincinnati, 2018 200 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. New FC Cincinnati stadium site and the connection to Over-the-Rhine. By connection 
OTR over Central Parkway to the new stadium, the flow of people and possibly redevelopment, can 
occur much easily. As a six-lane divided parkway this has always been seen as the “physical barrier” 
between these two neighborhoods 201 
                                                
200 Chris Wetterich, “FC Cincinnati Notebook: MLS commissioner heaps praise upon Cranley, throws 
shade at Columbus,” Cincinnati Business Courier, May 30, 2018. 
 
201 Michael Nyerges, “FC Cincinnati’s new stadium will tower over neighboring structures in the West 
End,” Cincinnati Enquirer, December 17, 2018. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In November 2018, the city of Cincinnati’s second master plan celebrated its 
70th birthday. Officially adopted on November 22, 1948, “The Cincinnati Metropolitan 
Master Plan and the Official Plan of the City of Cincinnati” was the primary 
governing document for the city until the “Coordinated City Plan, Volumes I-II” was 
published in 1980, thirty-two years later.202 The 1948 document, while vast in scope 
and widely praised as one of the best comprehensive plans of its time, was detrimental 
to many of the citizens of Cincinnati.  
After the Housing Act of 1949 was passed in July 1949 and the Interstate 
Highway Act of 1956 was passed by the United States Federal Government, the 
Master Plan made possible a large number of urban renewal projects in Cincinnati. 
The Housing and Interstate Highway Acts helped to fund the projects. This 1948 
Master Plan called for the elimination of slums, the addition of expressways 
throughout the city, and the need for more acreage for light industrial uses. These 
goals were to be achieved in the West End redevelopment of the next decade. 
Today, problems resulting from the demolition of the majority of the historic 
resources of the West End include the demolition the community’s shared identity and 
connection to the city of Cincinnati. As explained by Appler and Rumbach (2016):  
Historic resources are part of a community’s shared identity and function as 
places of memory and meaning for local residents. The physical fabric of a 
community can be seen as both reflecting and reinforcing cultural norms and 
                                                
202 City Planning Commission, The Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan and The Official City Plan of 
the City of Cincinnati. Print. https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/planning/plan-
cincinnati/resources/approved-city-of-cincinnati-plans/master-plans/. 
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social relations. If that fabric is destroyed, members of a disaster-affected 
community may be forced to ask fundamental and destabilizing questions 
about the nature of their relationship with each other and with the space in 
which their lives have been lived. Protecting historic resources can preserve a 
community’s shared identity and reinforce connections between neighbors and 
the larger community.203 
 
While the West End was once a thriving neighborhood of 25,757 residents with its 
own community identity and culture, the demolition of these resources has created a 
fragmented community that is no longer held together by the web of relationships that 
can exist in a neighborhood.204 This large problem is also being compounded as the 
rapid redevelopment of the nearby Over-the-Rhine neighborhood begins to push into 
the West End. With the physical fabric of the community being destroyed, former 
residents of the disaster-struck West End have been left without a physical connection 
to their community. As historic resources often function as sources of stability during 
times of change and serve as economic engines in both pre- and post-disaster contexts, 
this lack of stability can easily be seen in the West End.205 The median household 
income in the West End was $12,808 based on the 2010 census. As redevelopment 
continues to push into the West End, the current residents are being pushed from all 
sides in this “Catch 22” scenario. Often, historic structures have served as sources of 
stability. However, due to their demolition during the urban renewal era, these 
structures no longer exist. Since these structures no longer exist, their community is 
seen as a “blank slate” in which redevelopment can occur.  
                                                
203 Douglas Appler and Andrew Rumbach, “Building Community Resilience Through Historic 
Preservation,” Journal of the American Planning Association 82, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 93. 
 
204 Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock (New York: Random House, 2004), 218-219. 
 
205 Ibid, 101. 
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 On a psychological note, often times this level of destruction in an area is 
combined with root shock. “Root shock, at the level of the individual, is a profound 
emotional upheaval that destroys the working model of the world that had existed in 
the individual’s head...Root shock at the level of the community, be it neighborhood or 
something else, ruptures bonds, dispersing people to all directions of the compass.” 206 
This quote describes the phenomenon of root shock, a psychological problem occurs 
when one’s entire physical “map” of the world is destroyed, causing a type of 
traumatic stress reaction similar to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Often root 
shock is seen when neighborhoods or communities have been destroyed from a force 
of nature such as a hurricane or tornado. Dr. Mindy Thompson Fullilove has studied 
the phenomenon as it relates to those who have lost their communities through urban 
renewal. By displacing people and often families, members of communities who were 
destroyed by urban renewal, like the West End, often have little connection to the 
physical space that remains today. As people who are the most “rooted” to their towns 
are the ones who live within an hour’s drive of at least a half dozen family members of 
their extended family. By dropping a metaphorical “bomb” and destroying a 
community, like the West End, through urban renewal the families, social connection, 
memories of place, and just general connection to a place have been destroyed, similar 
to the discussion by Appler and Rumbach about the destabilization of these 
communities and their lack of remaining historic resources.207, 208 
                                                
206 Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock (New York: Random House, 2004), 14. 
 
207 Melody Warnick, This is Where You Belong (New York: Penguin Random House, 2016), 68. 
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Omissions and Limitations 
 More research for this project could have been done looking into the long-term 
effects at building sports stadiums in disadvantaged communities. This would have 
added context to the case of the FC Cincinnati stadium in the West End. It would have 
also been helpful to identify recent examples of the placement of sports arenas in areas 
effected by urban renewal of the mid-twentieth century, similar to the example of the 
Los Angeles’ Dodgers stadium in the Chavez Ravine neighborhood. What similarities 
and/or differences occurred in these two case studies? Are similar and/or different 
cases occurring in other parts of the globe? This research could have been an 
interesting addition as communities effected by urban renewal are trying to 
reincorporate themselves into the larger city context. 
 Additionally, this study could have been enhanced if the author did a longer, 
more in-depth study by staying in the community and gathering the perspectives of the 
current community dialogue. Perhaps more information about the day-to-day changes 
of the plans for the West End stadium could have gathered had the author been a 
member or had relocated to the community.  
 
What’s next for the West End? 
Many questions still remain about the future of the West End and its new-
found partnership with FC Cincinnati. Will the relationship turn out to be positive in 
the next few decades? Currently, development of the West End stadium is moving 
                                                                                                                                       
208 Douglas Appler and Andrew Rumbach, “Building Community Resilience Through Historic 
Preservation,” Journal of the American Planning Association 82, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 93. 
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forward as organizations operating out of the nearby Cincinnati Music Hall have 
concerns about the acoustic interference from the stadium. Music Hall is 
approximately 1,200 feet from the stadium site and city officials received sobering 
news from an acoustic test that was released in February 2019. The consulting firm, 
Akustiks, demonstrated that noise from a “typical game” would be, “. . . readily 
audible by the audience and performers” and will interfere with performances and 
rehearsals in Music Hall’s Springer Auditorium. The Cincinnati Arts Association 
(CAA), which operates Music Hall, and the hall’s performing resident companies – 
the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, Cincinnati Ballet, Cincinnati Opera, and the May 
Festival – commissioned the study because of concerns about noise intrusion from the 
stadium. CAA and FC Cincinnati were working on ways to remedy the issues as of 
late February 2019 with no reported solutions and no delay in stadium construction.209 
 The story of urban renewal in the West End does have one positive end 
result—the processes that led to the eventual Kenyon-Barr Urban Renewal Projects 
have become an opportunity for education among the planning discipline. Planners no 
longer privilege the construction of highway over the betterment of the citizens of 
Cincinnati. The public and community stakeholders are included in planning 
discussions and city planners often consult these viewpoints when making decisions, 
such as large master planning projects. The discipline of planning has learned from 
mistakes of its own past and has begun to incorporate these aspects in their long-range 
planning ideas. 
 
                                                
209 Sharon Coolidge, “Acoustics test: FC Cincinnati noise will impact Music Hall performances,” 
Cincinnati Enquirer, February 4, 2019. 
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Beyond Music Hall, the question of what happens next in the West End is one 
that can only be answered hypothetically. Ideally, the neighborhood would become a 
perfect planning comeback story. The city of Cincinnati, by investing millions of 
dollars to provide the professional soccer stadium, helps to support the neighborhood 
with a combination of community benefits for the schools, future businesses, and 
housing incentives. The housing built is mixed-income, the crime rates drop, and the 
neighborhood becomes a social, cultural, and political center, akin to any 
neighborhood in Cincinnati. Given the history of the city, this is a difficult future to 
imagine. With the rapid redevelopment of the nearby Over-the-Rhine neighborhood to 
the east, the vision of gentrification, rebuilding, rebranding, and eventual “takeover” 
of the neighborhood seems like a more likely outcome.  
 The West End neighborhood is being reconnected to the city with the stadium, 
but does this reconnection feel more like a bridge or a floodgate for redevelopment? 
Time will only tell what holds for the West End, but for now the neighborhood is left 
with major highways running through the center of its heart—like lasting scars 
reminding us of what used to be, what could be, and maybe what will happen to this 
once thriving neighborhood in the near future. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 The following images are a sampling of approximately 3,000 which have been 
digitized by the Cincinnati History Library and Archives. The entire collection of 
photographs (the majority which are not digitized) are also held by the Cincinnati 
History Library and Archives, and number in the tens of thousands. They are 
depictions of each building within the Kenyon-Barr Urban Renewal Project Area, 
most of which were slated for demolition and then torn down in the following decade. 
The address listed on the photos is the presumed address of the structure as it stood in 
1959 until its demolition. These photographs were taken throughout the year of 1959, 
with the date of each photo labeled on the sign held by the city of Cincinnati 
employee. The names of the city employees and other people, including adults and 
children who were photographed, are unknown. 
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